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The emergence of the New Public Management in the 1980s saw the introduction of 
several forms of governance aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in 
government. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) were such forms. However, the use 
of PPPs in government has received mixed reactions. In one breath PPPs are touted 
by some as a means of governance which can reduce costs, improve quality of 
service as well as enhance efficiency in the delivery of public service and 
infrastructure. In another, PPPs are criticised for compromising the crucial pillars of 
governance namely accountability, transparency and public participation. This study 
into in the Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link of South Africa reveals that PPPs may bring 
about both positive and negative outcomes as propounded by advocates and 
opponents of PPPs. This study further shows that if properly managed, factors that 
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1.1 Background to the Study  
Governments worldwide have adopted Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a 
governance approach in the delivery of public services (Skelcher, 2005: 34). The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as “the 
exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a nation‟s 
affairs” (UNDP, 1997:  9). According to Abdellatif (2003) the concept of governance  
encompasses the functioning and capability of the public sector, as well as 
the rules and institutions that create the framework for the conduct of both 
public and private business, including accountability for economic and 
financial performance, and regulatory frameworks relating to companies, 
corporations, and partnerships (Abdellatif, 2003:  5).  
The 1980s saw the rise of New Public Management (NPM) paradigm which was 
premised on the grounds that through emulation of private sector principles in the 
formulation and implementation of government programmes, public service delivery 
can be improved (Bangura and Larbi; Larbi, 2006). PPPs (Public Private 
Partnerships) became a popular approach under NPM. Literature on PPPs indicates 
that the improved efficiency and effectiveness associated with PPPs derive from the 
flexibility, resource pooling and responsiveness that are conveyed in PPPs through 
private sector participation (McQuaid, 2000). 
While several benefits such as cost savings, improved quality and improved 
efficiency (European Union, 2003; Skelcher, 2005; Burger, 2006) are touted to ensue 
from PPPs Teisman and Klijn (2002) and Greve and Hodge (2010) maintain that 
PPPs erode accountability, transparency and public participation which are the 
cornerstones of governance. 
 
1.2 Objectives and Research Questions of the Study. 
Against the mixed views which PPPs have received, this study aims to ascertain the 
merits and limitations of PPPs by examining the Gautrain PPP in South Africa. The 
objective is to provide a detailed description of this case study as well as establish a 
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thorough understanding of the origins and concept of PPPs; the legislative 
framework and the governance structure in which they operate in general and in a 
post-apartheid South Africa in particular.   
The South African law defines PPPs as “a contract between a government institution 
and a private party, where the private party performs an institutional function and/or 
uses state property in terms of output specifications. Substantial project risk 
(financial, technical and operational) is transferred to the private party and the private 
party benefits through unitary payments from government budgets and/or user fees” 
(National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2007:  5). 
The National Development Plan 2030 Our Future – Make it Work, South Africa‟s 
current broad socio-economic policy document that guides development in South 
Africa, identifies PPPs as a core vehicle for service delivery and infrastructure 
development (National Planning Commission, 2012:  183). 
This thesis has been organized around a number of research questions.  The broad 
questions informing this study are: 
 Where do PPPs originate from? 
 What are the rationales for the establishment of PPPs? 
 What types of PPPs are there and how are they implemented? 
 What are the alleged benefits of PPPs? 
 What critiques are leveled against PPPs? 
 What is the legislative and policy framework for PPPs in South Africa? 
The key questions that pertain to the Gautrain PPP are: 
 What are the factors that have led to the use of PPPs in the transport sector in 
South Africa? 
 What structures of governance have been set up to oversee the management 
of the Gautrain PPP? 
 What benefits have been conceded in the Gautrain PPP? 
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 What critiques have been leveled against the Gautrain PPP? 
1.3 The Significance of the Study 
PPPs are notoriously controversial.  The Gautrain PPP, for example, has been cited 
by some, such as the South African Institution of Civil Engineering (SAICE) (SAICE, 
2011:  56) and the Gautrain Management Agency (Gautrain Management Agency 
2013:  34) as a successful PPP. While Donaldson (2005) contends that the Gautrain 
has faced immense governance problems. The verdict remains open.  This study 
aims to provide an analysis of the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of PPPs 
as well as explore to what extent PPPs have been adopted in the South African 
context.   
The Gautrain PPP is one of the biggest PPPs in South Africa with a project cost of 
R26 billion (Dachs, 2011: slide 10) as such it is an initiative which the public and the 
civil society in South Africa have followed with keen interest (Quintal, 2006; 
Brummer, 2012). This study is again timely because the Department of Transport 
(DoT) through the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) has just called 
for the procurement of new rolling stock which has resulted in the Department‟s call 
for another concession (DoT, 2013: 60). Findings from this study could provide 
significant insight for any new PPP arrangements in the public transport sector.  
1.4 Research Methodology and Methods 
This study is a desktop research and entailed the summary, collection and analysis 
of existing research. Various sources of information were accessed to gather 
information. The research findings are based on an analysis of both primary and 
secondary sources of data. Primary sources included newspaper articles, press 
releases, government reports and strategic planning policies, government budgets 
and the Gautrain Management Agency‟s reports.  For the general background on 
PPPs, academic books and journal articles were used.  The legislative and policy 
framework for PPPs in South Africa was established by analyzing government 
legislation and policy documents.  The National Treasury Department, and the 
Department of Transport provided ample strategic policy documents.  Independent 
research institutions, such as the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), and 
more technical and scientific publications such as the Engineering News were also 
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consulted. Journals and newspaper articles provided valuable insight into the 
controversial debates surrounding the popularity/lack of support for PPPs in South 
Africa.  These same sources provided information on the ongoing debates on the 
merits of the Gautrain PPP. The data gathered was then used to answer the 
identified research question. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has six chapters. Chapter 1 (this chapter) provides the objectives 
and research questions to be addressed in this dissertation as well as the 
significance and methodology of the research. Chapter 1 also provides the outline 
and the summary for each of the chapters making up this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 2 examines the background of PPPs; the governance structure; financing 
mechanisms; and the defining characteristics of PPPs. Furthermore, the rationale; 
the types; the benefits and limitations of PPPs are discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the South African experiences with PPPs. In so doing the 
chapter highlights the enabling legislative and policy frameworks for PPPs in South 
Africa and processes for PPPs. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the administration of public transport in South 
Africa and the factors that have led to the use of PPPs in the sector. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link project (Gautrain) which is one of 
the PPPs implemented in the transport sector in South Africa. The Gautrain PPP is 
used as a case study to investigate the arguments posited for and against PPPs.  
 
The last chapter, Chapter 6, highlights the outcomes to date of the Gautrain PPP. 
The chapter also offers some suggestions that may promote the successful 





 CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUALISING PPPs 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explored the different ways in which PPPs are conceptualized. PPP 
definitions by selected governments and scholars are used to demonstrate the 
various meanings PPPs are associated with. The chapter also underscores the 
defining characteristics of PPPs. The chapter further traces the origins of PPPs and 
the manner in which they have evolved over the years. Discussion of key benefits 
and limitations of PPPs are an integral part of the chapter. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting of mechanisms that can contribute to the successful formulation and 
implementation of PPPs. 
2.2 What are PPPs?  
Bangura and Larbi (2006) and Kamarck (2007) points to the New Public 
Management (NPM) paradigm as the originator of PPPs and further suggest that 
inefficiencies and ineffective public service delivery prompted NPM principles. While 
Linder (1999); Teisman and Klijn (2002) and HDR (2005) agree that PPPs are  a 
form of governance, they have diverging views on what amounts to PPPs and 
whether PPPs are new forms of governance. This section will explore these 
suggestions and views in detail. 
According to Bangura and Larbi (2006) and Kamarck (2007) PPPs which „may be 
seen as new forms of governance‟ (Teisman and Klijn, 2002:  197) may be traced to 
NPM, a movement that started in the 1980s.  Bangura and Larbi (2006) and 
Kamarck (2007) claim that discontent by the public with the way government 
delivered public services led to the development of NPM concept. Bangura and Larbi 
(2006) and Kamarck (2007) contend that government operations prior to 1980 were 
characterized by delays and inadequate services. According to Bangura and Larbi 
(2006) and Kamarck (2007) the situation arose from rigid adherence to rules; 
processes and domination of the State in the provision of public services. 
Consequently, not only was service delivery not cost-effective but did not also have 
the effects desired by the public (Bangura and Larbi, 2006; Kamarck, 2007). 
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Kamarck (2007) argues that poor service delivery by the government was in sharp 
contrast to the service delivery by private sector. Kamark expounds that through 
utilization of technology and flexibility in serving clients the private sector provided 
services which were less costly and less time consuming to access (Kamarck, 2007:  
1). Bangura and Larbi (2006) and Kamarck (2007) claim that it was the better service 
delivery obtaining in the private sector that led to the belief that the structure and  
principles of private sector were worth emulating if service delivery in government 
was to improve. The reforms introduced to copy the private sector structure and 
principles were thus collectively christened NPM (Bangura and Larbi, 2006; 
Kamarck, 2007).  
Technically Hood (1991) and Pollitt (1993) cited in Larbi (2006) define NPM as “an 
ideological thought-system based on ideas generated in the private sector and 
imported into the public sector” (Larbi, 2006:  26). According to Larbi, the private 
sector ideas center on two principles. The first principle is „managerialism‟ which 
focuses on delegation of management duties and recognition of the importance of 
results of services over processes. Use of business ideas of competition, contracting 
and user-responsiveness in the delivery of public services constitute the second 
principle (Larbi, 2006).  
While some countries such as United Kingdom and United States of America have 
followed NPM as a matter of policy change or ideology (Skelcher, 2005), for other 
countries compliance with international requirements has been the main driving 
force. For example, Hall (2008) observes that some countries in Europe embrace 
NPM principles in line with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 which restricts government 
borrowing (Hall, 2008:  4). Similarly the World Bank Public Sector Reform: What 
Works and Why? Evaluation Report of 2008 concludes that developing countries 
have pursued NPM as a consequence of pressure from international donors. 
According to the Report, the attachment of access to loans to the implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) compelled governments to put into 
practice SAPs. SAPs which were introduced by World Bank in the early 1980s to 
assist in the stimulation of the economies of the developing countries encapsulate 
NPM principles such as reduction of the role of the public sector in the delivery of 
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public services and the promotion of market competition in the delivery of public 
services (World Bank, 2008). 
Manning (2001) states that NPM “provides a menu of choices rather a single option” 
for “getting things done better” in government (Manning, 2001:  298). It is against this 
background of a variety of NPM choices that PPPs are embedded. The European 
Commission (EU) (2003) attests that PPPs under the banner of NPM are just but 
one of the means of governance that the public sector is using to tap “private sector 
operational efficiencies” (EC, 2003:  6).  
There are, however, diverging views on what constitutes a PPP and on whether 
PPPs are totally new forms of governance or not.  
Teisman and Klijn (2002) claim that most of the collaborations currently called PPPs 
actually are contracting out schemes that governments have ordinarily used to 
procure services from the private sector. Teisman and Klijn argue that the ideal 
PPPs assimilate joint decision making between the government and the private party 
to a PPP from the identification of a policy problem through to the implementation of 
a solution. Teisman and Klijn contend that most public sector and private sector 
collaborations tagged as PPPs, such as the Public Finance Initiatives (PFIs) of the 
United Kingdom, lack this characteristic and therefore do not qualify to be called 
PPPs (Teisman and Klijn, 2002:  198). 
Linder (1999) avows that PPPs are not new schemes of governance but rather 
veiled privatization schemes. Privatization were schemes of governance 
implemented by governments in the 1980s and were aimed at reducing the activities 
directly provided by government (Kamarck, 2007; World Bank, 2008). (HDR (2005) 
define privatization as “the shifting of whole functions and responsibilities over assets 
from a public entity to a private entity” (HDR, 2005:  1). Linder explains that the 
negativity which privatization received in the 1980s as result of loss of jobs and 
corruption has prompted governments to restyle privatization as PPP (Linder, 1999:  
89). 
HDR (2005) maintains that PPPs are neither contracting out schemes that have 
always been used in government nor privatization but rather new forms of 
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governance. HDR affirms that in PPPs unlike in contracting out, the private sector 
assumes more risk on capital and resources invested. HDR adds that in privatization 
government relinquishes all its responsibilities over an asset to the private sector in 
full and often permanently while in PPPs government retains ownership of assets 
(HDR, 2005:  1). On that basis, HDR contend that PPPs are new forms of 
governance (HDR, 2005).  
Hodge and Greve (2007) observe that PPPs may be viewed as both new forms of 
governance and old forms governance. Hodge and Greve suggest that the 
determining feature to classify PPPs as new or old forms of governance should be 
the purpose to which the PPP arrangement will be put (Hodge and Greve, 2007:  
548). 
It seems then that the core objective of NPM is to make the public sector more 
efficient and more effective. Further, it may be concluded that NPM reforms aim at 
eliminating the top-down and centralized means of government through the 
introduction of flexibility and competitiveness in government by importation of private 
sector ideas and the private sector itself into public service delivery.  And PPPs 
emerge as a subset within the NPM paradigm. 
2.3 Governance Structure for PPPs 
Means of governance require rules, institutional arrangements and processes to 
carry them (Diamond, 1999).  
According to Abdellatif (2003), governance  
encompasses the functioning and capability of the public sector, as well as 
the rules and institutions that create the framework for the conduct of both 
public and private business, including accountability for economic and 
financial performance, and regulatory frameworks relating to companies, 
corporations, and partnerships (Abdellatif, 2003:  5).  
In other words, governance is manifested through rules, institutions and processes 
that government puts in place to guide the manner the government as well as the 
non-state actors carry out their business. Accordingly, PPPs need policy and 
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regulatory frameworks; institutional structures as well as processes to enable their 
application (World Bank, 2011:  15). The purposes that policy and regulatory 
frameworks; institutional structures as well as processes serve in PPPs are 
discussed below. 
2.3.1 Legislative and Policy Framework  
The World Bank (2011) claims that the legislative and regulatory frameworks on 
PPPs enable government institutions to enter into partnerships with private sector 
institutions for the provision of services originally provided by government only and 
enable the private sector to collect user fees. The World Bank adds that policy 
frameworks provide guidelines for implementation of PPP projects as well as 
mechanism for monitoring (World Bank, 2011:  17). For example, in America 38 
states had enacted laws enabling procurement through PPPs by 2010 (National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 2010:  15). And in 2010 the government of 
India developed user guide which provides directions on PPPs decision making 
processes for infrastructure projects (Government of India, Ministry of Finance, 
2010). 
2.3.2 Institutional Structures 
According to World Bank (2011) some of the key government institutions and 
structures in the governance of PPPs are the PPP Unit, project board and project 
management team. The World Bank claims that while the PPP Unit provides 
assistance to governments departments in the preparation of PPP projects; 
approves PPPs and develops policy documents on PPPs, the actual day to day 
management of the PPP is carried out by a project management team with 
delegated powers from a board. Figure 2.1 below shows the governance structure of 







Figure 2.1: PPP Project Governance Structure 
 
     Source: World Bank, 2011:  81 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that the project board is the link between the programme board 
and the project management group. The structure intertwines the programme board; 
project board, project management group and a set of advisers.  
In addition, the World Bank notes that the governance structure of PPPs may have 
the presence of policy level committee comprising of politicians. According to the 
World Bank the policy committee selects projects to be procured through PPPs; 
monitors PPP projects and provides PPP guidelines on financing and approval. 
According to World Bank, India has such a committee. Furthermore the World Bank 
points out that the PPP governance structure may integrate project advisors in the 
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areas of technical; financial; environment; legal and social impact and provide advice 
to the PPP project teams. For instance, Jordan used the International Finance 
Corporation in 2007 as advisors in the expansion of Queen Alia International Airport 
(World Bank, 2011). 
According to Greve and Hodge (2010) PPPs also entail creation of special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) to link up government departments on the one side and private sector 
institutions on the other. Greve and Hodge claim that government departments may 
include ministries and agencies connected to the PPP project while the PPP private 
party to the PPP together with its partners; the financiers and the investors make up 
private sector side (Greve and Hodge, 2010:  154).  
2.3.3 Processes and Project Cycle 
The EU (2003) highlights the key processes in PPPs as project identification; project 
appraisal; project design and agreement; procurement and implementation as shown 
in Figure 2.2 below.  
Figure 2.2 PPP Project Cycle 
 
Source: European Union, 2003:  76 
The project identification; project appraisal and project design and agreement 
processes involve evaluation of the feasibility or viability of the PPP; infrastructure, 
risks, costs, benefits and type of PPP to be associated with the PPP whereas 
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procurement and implementation processes entail  monitoring of the PPP to ensure 
achievement of value for money (EU, 2003: 75). 
PPP governance therefore call for establishment of regulatory and policy 
frameworks; institutions and processes to facilitate their carriage. 
2.4 PPPs Financing 
The World Bank (2011) specifies three main means of financing in PPPs and these 
are project finance or limited recourse finance; corporate finance and public/private 
funding. In project finance, the World Bank points out that the private party sources 
funding from investors who may be contractors within the PPP or third party financial 
investors as well as through borrowing from banks. With respect to corporate 
finance, the World Bank observes that the private party finances the PPP project 
through funds from money lenders such as banks. In relation to public/private 
funding, according to World Bank, the PPP project is jointly financed by the 
government and the private party. The World Bank claims that the sources of 
government funding may include government revenue or loans from national, 
regional or international lending institutions while the private sector may use sources 
described in project finance and corporate finance (World Bank, 2011). 
PPPS implementation may therefore benefit from three main sources of funding.  
2.5 Defining Characteristics of PPPs 
PPPs embody certain characteristics that identify them and therefore separate them 
from other types of public service and infrastructure delivery. This section will assess 
these defining characteristics. The section will, however, commence with definitions 
ascribed to PPPs by different bodies.  
According to McQuaid (2000) the meaning a PPP takes in any given situation is 
shaped by historical, economic, social and political factors (McQuaid, 2000:  10). 
McQuaid adds that the purpose, variety of partners and their roles and means of 
implementing the PPP further impact on the definition of PPPs (McQuaid, 2000). 
In the United Kingdom, PPPs are largely prompted by economic and political factors 
such as reduction on government borrowing and inclusion of the private sector in 
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policy implementation (Greve and Hodge, 2010:  151). The British government 
therefore defines PPPs as  
„arrangements typified by joint working between the public and the private. In 
their broadest sense they can cover all types of collaboration across the 
private-public sector involving collaborative working together and risk sharing 
to deliver policies, services and infrastructure‟ (Her Majesty‟s Treasury quoted 
in OECD, 2011:  4).  
Countries in Africa use PPPs mostly to meet demands for public services (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC), 2005:  1), just as is the case in Latin 
America and the Indian sub-continent (Skelcher, 2005:  348). One could therefore 
argue that countries in Africa, Latin America and the Indian sub-continent the 
definitions for PPPs tilt towards defining PPPs according to their purpose. For 
example, the Republic of Ghana defines PPPs as “a contractual arrangement 
between a public entity and a private sector party, with clear agreement on shared 
objectives for the provision of public infrastructure and services traditionally provided 
by the public sector” (Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, 2011:  2).  
Definitions of PPPs do not only apply across different governments but among 
different authors as well. Klijn and Teisman (2000:  95) define PPPs as “forms of co-
production, cooperation, in which the parties realize products, services or policy 
outcomes jointly”. For Grimsey and Lewis (2005) “PPPs are arrangements whereby 
private parties participate in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure, 
and a PPP project results in a contract for a private entity to deliver public 
infrastructure-based services” (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005:  xiv). 
Despite a wide variety of definitions for PPPs, closer examination of most of the 
definitions reveals a number of common characteristics that define PPPs. Foremost, 
it may be apparent from the definitions that PPPs are collaborative arrangements 
involving the public sector and the private sector that end in the joint provision of 
public infrastructure or service. Other key defining characteristics of PPPs that may 
be discerned from the definitions are its participants; the decision making process; 
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the contractual agreements; and the sharing of risk.  Each of these will be discussed 
below: 
Participants: Just like any partnerships, PPPs involve collaboration of one or more 
partners but as it may be obvious from the different conceptualization of PPPs 
discussed above, one of them ought to be a public sector institution and the other 
private. Nevertheless, the established arrangements within PPPs may necessitate 
courting in of other participants. Bagal (2008) affirms that the various agreements in 
the PPPs gives rise to the involvement of a wide array of other participants such as 
“project sponsors, investors, operators, insurers, suppliers, contractors and sub-
contractors” (Bagal, 2008:  24). PPPs may therefore bring together a diverse of 
participants in the delivery of public service. 
Resource Sharing: Another aspect that may be gleamed from the PPP definitions is 
the resource-sharing amongst participants. Teisman and Klijn (2002) observe that as 
result of competition and increased demand for both public and private services, 
resource interdependency between public sector and the private sector has 
increased (Teisman and Klijn, 2002:  198). As Heinz (2005) observes, the public 
sector may depend on the professional competences and capacity of the private 
sector to deliver infrastructure while the private sector may depend on the public 
sector assets to make profit (Heinz, 2005:  4). It may therefore be concluded that 
participants in PPPs depend on the resources of each other to achieve 
organizational goals and it is this resource interdependency that sometimes plays a 
pivotal role in motivating organizations into partnerships. 
Joint decision making: Joint decision making appears to be yet another issue in 
PPPs. Joint decision making in PPPs may manifest in the joint problem specification 
and solution to be achieved through PPPs by government and a private sector 
institution. Grimsey and Lewis concur that PPPs “need to be long term and 
relational” (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005:  xv). In other words, “PPPs are closely-knit, 
intensive and entail combined efforts in resolving policy matters” (Teisman and Klijn, 
2002:  204).  
Contractual agreements: Bagal (2008) affirms that contractual agreements convey 
legal, financial and operational principles that then guide PPPs. Bagal adds that the 
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PPP agreements spell out responsibilities of each partner and performance levels 
expected of the private partner (Bagal, 2008:  24). HDR (2005) enjoins that contract 
agreements afford shared use of skills and assets belonging either to the public 
sector or the private sector for delivery of public services or infrastructure (HDR, 
2005:  3). Bagal (2008) cites concession agreements as an example of PPP 
contractual agreement (Bagal, 2008:  24) 
Risk sharing: Another noteworthy feature for PPPs is sharing of risks related to the 
PPP between the public sector and the private sector. EU defines risk as “any factor, 
event or influence that may threaten the successful completion of a project in terms 
of time, cost and quality” (EU, 2003:  50). According to EU the thumb rule for 
allocation of risks in PPPs is that “the party best able to manage the risk should be 
allocated the risk” (EU, 2003:  50). The party allocated a risk is therefore responsible 
for solving potential problems in case of need. Examples of risks include „revenue 
risk which may arise from poor forecasting of PPP project revenues; construction risk 
which may arise from unknown geological conditions and public acceptance risk 
which may emanate from non-acceptance of the project by the local communities‟ 
(EU, 2003). 
Bagal (2008) claims that some PPP projects are by nature amenable to risks. Bagal 
cites capital intensive projects and urban construction projects as such risk prone-
projects (Bagal, 2008:  24-25). Bagal explains that the vulnerability of capital 
intensive and urban construction projects arise from their complexity and high debt 
equity ratio; as well as shifting of utilities and land acquisition components the 
projects may entail respectively. 
PPPs may therefore be differentiated from ordinary partnerships by the participants 
involved; interdependency on resources; joint decision making; contractual 
agreements and risk sharing by the public sector and the private sector that 
eventually lead to the delivery of public services or infrastructure.  
2.6 Rise and Rationale for PPPs 
While the concept of PPPs is not new, the period between 1945 and 1980 witnessed 
decreased use of PPPs. PPPs only regained prominence in the 1980s. Various 
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rationale for the re-emergence of PPPs are put forward. The reasons are need to 
access private funding; to improve public service and infrastructure delivery; to 
access private sector competencies and capacities and inescapability of 
interdependency between organisations. These rationale will now be discussed. 
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2005) the concept of PPPs is not new. Grimsey 
and Lewis argue that PPPs were in use as early as 1638 and cite the funding and 
construction  of the de Briare canal in France in 1638 which was accomplished 
through a PPP as an exemplar (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005:  xiii).  
The decline in the use of PPPs may be detected between 1945 and 1980 when 
provision of public services came to be regarded as the primary responsibility of the 
public sector. According to Bangura and Larbi (2006) at the height of the welfare 
state, after World War II the paradigm was one of highly interventionist state. The 
state took control of developments and most assets and services were nationalized. 
This view was mostly prevalent in Europe. The emergence of NPM in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, nonetheless, meant an end to the interventionist state as fiscal crisis 
alerted governments to the impossibility of a welfare state. NPM therefore re-opened 
public service provision through PPPs albeit in modified version (Bangura and Larbi, 
2006). 
EU (2003) affirms that the rekindled interest in PPPs arise from the need to access 
private funding in the face of public financial limitations faced by the majority of 
governments. The centralization of public service and infrastructure delivery prior to 
1980 led to financial crisis (Bangura and Larbi, 2006). Coupled to that, different 
exigencies, for instance, Maastricht Treaty and SAPs limited public spending.  Thus 
in view of the public financial constraints government have turned to PPPs to access 
private funding to support provision of public services and infrastructure (EC, 2003). 
According to Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2010) Africa alone require 
approximately $93 billion annually to meet public infrastructural needs against an 
available $45 billion that the governments in Africa are able to raise every year from 
public funding sources for delivery of public services (Foster and Briceno-




Harris (2003) claims that governments‟ involvement of the private sector in the 
delivery of public services and infrastructure is motivated by the need to improve 
access to public infrastructure. Harris points out that the monopoly of government 
institutions in the provision of public services widespread after 1939 - 1945 world war 
led to inefficiencies in the delivery of public services and infrastructure now evident in 
the large number of the public without access to public infrastructure and the 
significant infrastructure in need of maintenance, especially in developing countries. 
Harris therefore argues that PPPs are being employed to enable governments 
increase access and improve public services and infrastructure (Harris, 2003:  1).  
According to Heinz (2005) the driving force behind PPPs is to enable the public 
sector “access professional competences and capacities of the private sector” 
(Heinz, 2005:  4). Harris (2003) adds that the efficiency of the private sector is 
derived from motivation to make profit, clear objectives and rational pricing (Harris, 
2003:  5). Kamarck (2007) affirms that the private sector is regarded to be efficient 
and effective as a result of flexibility, innovation and measurement of performance 
that typify the conduct of private sector business (Kamarck, 2007). It is therefore 
argued that by integrating the private sector in the delivery of public service and 
infrastructure there is anticipation that the public sector will learn from the private 
sector and therefore enable the public sector improve service and infrastructure 
delivery (Harris, 2003; Heinz, 2005; Kamarck, 2007). 
Klijn and Teisman (2000) contend that in the network society in which public and 
private sector organizations operate, PPPs are inevitable. O‟Toole quoted in 
Agranoff and Mcguire (1999) defines networks as “structures of interdependence 
involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the 
formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement (Agranoff 
and Mcguire, 1999:  20). Klijn and Teisman (2000) opine that resources and 
knowledge that organizations, including government, require to fulfill goals are 
dispersed in different organizations as such cooperation with other actors is 
unavoidable if projects, proposals and outcomes are to be accomplished (Klijn and 
Teisman, 2000:  90). Thus it is as a result of the interdependency of organizations 
that PPPs have become useful. 
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PPPs are therefore embraced for a variety of reasons that aim to improve the 
operations and the provision of public services and infrastructure.    
2.7 Types of PPPs 
PPPs may be applied using several PPP options. This section will discuss these 
PPP types and highlight the factors that influence decisions on the type of PPP to be 
used in particular projects in the transport sector. The section will also highlight 
instances where each of the PPP types may be applied in the transport sector. 
According to World Bank Toolkit for Selecting an Option for Private Participation of 
1997, PPPs may be applied using various types. The different types of PPPs are 
service contract; management contract; lease; concession and build-own-operate 
contracts (BOO) and divestiture. BOO contracts may be applied with different 
modifications such as build-own-transfer (BOT) and design-build-finance-operate-
transfer (DBFOT) among various models of contracts (Alfen, H.W. et al, 2009:  18). 
Each of the mentioned PPP types are differentiated from the others by asset 
ownership; operations and maintenance; capital investment and commercial risk 
allotment arrangements between the public sector and the private sector.  Table 2.1 
below shows the different types of PPPs and their corresponding arrangements.   
Table 2.1: Types of PPPs 
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Source: World Bank, 1997:  3  
Table 2.1 demonstrates that PPP types may also be distinguished from each other 
by the period of the contract. For example, service and management contracts have 
relatively shorter contract periods than lease, concession and BOO contracts. In 
addition each of the PPP type requires different performance levels from the private 
party and places different responsibilities on government. The performance levels 
and government responsibilities are discussed below: 
Service Contract: In service contract the private party to the PPP provides technical 
expertise in the operation of a public service or a facility. However, government 
retains management and investment responsibilities over the service or facility. 
Besides, the private party is paid a fee for the provision of the technical expertise 
(World Bank, 1997; EU, 2003). Examples of service contracts may include provision 
of legal services during disputes with stakeholders such as construction contractors. 
Management Contract: In management contract the private entity is responsible for 
the operation as well as management of a public service or infrastructure while 
government controls decisions regarding new investment in the services or the 
infrastructure. Government pays the private entity a fee for the operation and the 
management of the public service or facility (World Bank, 1997; EU, 2003). For 
instance, maintenance of facilities and equipment such as signaling facilities in rail 
transport may constitute management contract type of PPP.  
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Lease: With regard to lease, the private party rents a facility belonging to 
government in order to make profit. Under lease agreements government is 
obligated to maintain and expand the facility in case of need, nonetheless, the 
private party may undertake specific repairs. In return for use of the public facility, 
the private party pays government rental fees (World Bank, 1997; EU, 2003).  
Examples of lease agreements include lease of port facilities.  
Concession: In respect of concessions, the private party finances and operates a 
public facility. During the contract period the private party recovers its capital and 
makes some profit through user fees. Maintenance of the facility becomes the 
responsibility of the private party while government assumes regulatory role (World 
Bank, 1997; EU, 2003). Concession agreements for the construction and operation 
of rail links may constitute instances of concession PPP options. 
BOO: In BOO contracts, the private party has the responsibility of designing, 
constructing and operating an asset or assets for government. At the expiry of the 
contract, the asset reverts or becomes governments‟. In BOO contracts the role of 
government is to ensure that the asset is constructed according to the specifications 
of government (World Bank, 1997; EU, 2003). Examples of BOO contracts are 
designing, construction and operation of roads.  
Divestiture: Entail sale of government shares or assets to a private party. 
Divestiture may be full or partial. In full divestiture the private party assumes full and 
permanent ownership of a government facility while in partial divestiture government 
has partial ownership in the management of the facility (World Bank, 1997; EU, 
2003). Examples of divestiture are the sale of airports. 
Besides the varying performance levels the PPP options apportion on the private 
party, each PPP distributes different degrees of risk to the private party as shown in 






Figure 2.3 PPP Risk Distribution 
 
Source: HDR, 2012:  3 
From Figure 2.3 above it may be argued that the risk associated with a PPP type is 
interrelated with the duration of the PPPs and the longer the PPP contract the more 
risk the private party assume. For example, long term contracts such as BOO carry 
more risks than service contracts.  
Under the section on Defining Characteristics of PPPs, historical, economic, social, 
political factors and purpose, variety of partners and means of implementation a PPP 
were highlighted as factors which influence the option of PPP to be applied in given 
situations. However, in the transport sector, according to EU (2003) the key 
determining factors for the choice of PPP type are size and scope  of the project; the 
degree of risk transfer required and the extent to which user tolls may be applied 
(EU, 2003:  26). The EU expounds that concessions are best suited to situations 
such as major road projects where financing, collection of user fees and risk of traffic 
demand is borne by the private sector while BOT contracts work well in cases where 
government finances the project and bear the risk of demand and the private sector 
receives user fees (EU, 2003:  27).  
PPPs therefore come in different types and the roles played by government and the 
private party as well as the risks assumed varies with each option. In respect to 
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PPPs in transport, magnitude of the project; extent of risk transfer to the private party 
and toll collection arrangements influence the PPP type applicable. 
2.8 Benefits of PPPs  
The literature on PPPs points out to a number of benefits of PPPs. The main benefits 
or advantages identified by various authors are cost savings; improved quality; 
rapidity; efficiency and economic development.  
(i) Cost savings 
Skelcher (2005) claims that cost-saving is underlined as one of the benefits of 
contracting-out in studies conducted on the scheme. Skelcher cites studies 
conducted by Savas in 2000 which found cost savings of up to 40% in contracting 
out schemes in United States government services. Similarly, a survey conducted by 
Domberger and Jensen in 1997 established cost savings of around 20% in the 
United Kingdom and Australia as a result of competitive tendering (Skelcher, 2005:  
359). Management contracts have the potential to lead to the realization of cost 
savings since the private sector entity may use own resources such as funding and 
human resources to fulfill contractual agreements thus saving government from 
paying salaries.  
(ii) Improved Quality 
EU (2003) maintains that PPPs improve the quality of public services and 
infrastructure. EU argues that payment based on attainment of performance 
standards; competition in the identification of PPP private partners by government on 
the one hand and better supporting assets and novelty by the private party on the 
other hand stimulate provision of improved services and infrastructure (EU, 2003:  
15). The World Bank in a Policy Working Paper on Urban Transport for 2014 
contend that scrutiny of PPP projects by institutions with a stake in the PPP such as 
finance lenders and investors further enhance quality of PPPs. The World Bank 
argues that finance lenders and investors are wary of their capital invested in 
projects and will therefore ensure that that the projects achieve quality to avoid loss 
of the capital (World Bank, 2014:  4). With reference to the PPP options cited above, 
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service contracts may lead to improved quality as a result of technical expertise 
provided by the private sector firm. 
 (iii) Rapidity  
HDR (2012) contend that projects under PPPs are completed faster than through 
purely government process. HDR notes that the private sector institutions are free 
from some of the procedural and regulatory trappings such as financial and 
procurement procedures that often delay progress of projects in governments (HDR, 
2012:  3). The World Bank (2014) adds that the risks that the private parties carry in 
PPP projects act as further inducements for private parties to work within time and 
budget. The World Bank notes that private parties are apprehensive of costs that 
may arise from working outside schedule and budget hence will endeavor to work 
within schedule and budget (World Bank, 2014:  4).  Gosling cited in Burger (2006) in 
2004 indicated that 76% of the PFI projects were finished on time compared to 30% 
projects procured through ordinary government procurement methods (Burger, 2006:  
3).  
(iv) Improved Efficiency 
Burger (2006) argues that the private party to PPPs brings two types of efficiency to 
PPP projects. The two types of efficiency are technical efficiency premised on the 
notion of „minimum inputs but maximum outputs‟ and x-efficiency based on the 
principle of „prevention of wasteful use of inputs‟. Burger contend that the private 
party is compelled to be efficient in PPP projects as a result of technical and 
operational risks assumed in PPPs. Efficiency leads to cost savings and reduced 
time for completion of projects‟ (Burger, 2006:  2). BOO are likely to benefit from 
improved efficiency because of the construction and operational responsibilities that 
the private party acquires in PPP projects.  
(v) Economic Development  
According to Chollar (1979) and Friesecke (2006) PPPs enhance economic 
development. Chollar and Friesecke cite the effect PPPs have in uplifting economic 
viability of urban centers consequently attracting investment and creation of job 
opportunities as well as other income generating activities. Chollar asserts that the 
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government of the United States specifically introduced a “negotiated investment 
strategy” which, among several things included pooling of public and private 
resources to improve the viability of the cities that were declining (Chollar, 1979:  
163). Similarly in 2006 Germany had 100 PPPs in real estate projects in 
municipalities (Friesecke, 2006:  1). According to the two authors, the introduction of 
PPPs not only improved the cities but also raised the economic status of the 
residents in the cities (Chollar, 1979; Friesecke, 2006). 
Hodge and Greve (2007) caution that the benefits derived from PPPs do not apply in 
each PPP project uniformly. Hodge and Greve point out that an assessment of 
research findings on outcomes indicates instances where PPPs have been 
successful and instances where there results have not been successful. Therefore 
the benefits that PPPs may bring to the public sector should not be taken for granted 
(Hodge and Greve, 2007:  553).  
2.9 Limitations of PPPs 
There are a number of key limitations of PPPs identified in the literature.  These are:  
accountability; transparency; responsiveness; fraud, corruption and undue influence.  
These will be discussed below:   
(i) Accountability 
Teisman and Klijn (2002) argue that PPPs are poor on accountability. Teisman and 
Klijn observe that the public sector and the private sector operate in different 
contexts and therefore are answerable to different constituencies. The public sector 
is accountable to the voting public through, for example, legislatures. On the other 
hand the private sector is responsible to an appointed board of directors and/or its 
shareholders. When the public sector and the private sector are brought together 
under the PPPs umbrella, accountability becomes complex. The day-to-day activities 
of the private partners are not directly accountable to the legislature. In that respect 
therefore PPPs fail to meet accountability tenets of the public sector (Teisman and 




(ii) Transparency and Public Participation 
Greve and Hodge (2010) add that PPPs fall short on transparency. Greve and 
Hodge contend that as a result of the technical nature of PPPs government often 
engage consultants to develop and negotiate PPP contracts. Consequently PPPs 
meetings are dominated by the consultants; departments intending to apply the 
PPPs and investors leaving out the public and other interested stakeholders (Greve 
and Hodge, 2010:  154). In fact a survey by state departments of transport in 
America on PPPs reported by NCSL (2010), found that 30% respondents were 
concerned with lack of transparency in PPPs (NCSL, 2010:  12). 
(iii) Institutional Capacity 
Furthermore, according to Bagal (2008) the other factor that impedes implementation 
of PPPs is lack of institutional capacity in government departments. Bagal argues 
that the manpower in government departments not only lack skills and expertise to 
develop PPP contracts and identify PPP risks but also lack skills and expertise for 
PPP project management (Bagal, 2008:  25). World Bank (2014) affirms that 
institutional challenges are particularly evident when contributions of other 
governments departments other than the agency employing the PPPs are crucial to 
the application of the PPP. The World Bank states that poor coordination and limited 
decision powers of the other governments may constrain outcomes of PPPs (World 
Bank, 2014:  9). 
(iv) Loss of Control over Public Service or Facility 
NCSL (2010) points out that one of the limitations of PPPs is loss of control of 
government over a public service or infrastructure particularly in long term contracts 
such as concessions.  NCSL argues that in contracts such as concessions the 
powers of government over the service or asset under concession are limited 
particularly where there are clauses that prohibit government from introducing 
competition in the area of the concession.  NCSL contend that in such cases 
government may be constrained from introducing more PPPs to enhance provision 
of service even when the need is apparent (NCSL, 2010:  11). 
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Governance deficiencies and inadequate institutional capacities thus limit the public 
image and results of PPPs. 
2.10 Factors Affecting the Outcomes of PPPs 
The literature on PPPs has identified both PPPs strengths and weaknesses.   Based 
on their findings, authors have identified a number of factors which they regard as 
significant for the attainment of the objectives of any PPP.   Among the key factors 
are:  political will; legal and regulatory framework and monitoring.  The subsequent 
section now discusses each of these key factors based on the literature on PPPs 
and summarizes the authors‟ opinions as to why these factors are regarded as 
integral for the success of a PPP. 
(i) Political Will 
The UNESC (2005) maintain that political will is very crucial to the successful 
outcome of PPPs. The UNESC notes that political will may be expressed through 
awareness programmes concerning PPPs, capacity building initiatives such training 
for actors in PPPs; establishment of offices to manage PPPs and the elimination of 
political interference and public sector monopoly over the provision of public 
services. According to UNESC such mechanisms provide conducive environment for 
private participation and effective outcomes of PPPs (UNESC, 2005).  
(ii) Legal and Regulatory Framework 
According to EU (2003) another fundamental aspect to the outcome of PPPs is the 
development of legal and regulatory frameworks to guide the operation and 
management of PPPs. EU observe that legal and regulatory frameworks determine 
the procedures to be followed in the identification of partners, debt agreement limits 
and types of PPPs acceptable and thus facilitating smooth implementation of PPPs 
(EC, 2003).  
(iii) Monitoring 
According to Bagal monitoring of the operations and the performance of PPPs by 
requisite government oversight is another backbone to the success of PPPs. Bagal 
claim that regular spot checks and mandatory submission of progress reports by 
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management teams running PPPs may guarantee achievement of the objectives of 
PPPs (Bagal, 2008).   
(iv) Management 
Klijn and Teisman (2000) claim that PPPs are unique due to the public and the 
private sector characteristics they embody and therefore require management styles 
different from ordinary public sector management techniques. Klijn and Teisman 
suggest a combination of project management; process management and network 
reconstitution. Klijn and Teisman expound that in project management clarification of 
objectives, mobilizing of resources and development of contracts take center stage. 
With regard to process management core activities include luring of important 
partners and development of rules and procedures that are broad enough to 
accommodate goals of all various partners. Crucial also in process management is 
establishment of structures through which partners may interact. Network 
reconstitution involves development of regulatory frameworks that stipulate rules and 
procedures for incorporating new actors and ideas as well as distribution of benefits. 
According to Klijn and Teisman these management techniques increase chances of 
PPPs being successful (Klijn and Teisman, 2000:  94-96). 
It seems the factors affect the outcome of PPPs boil down to how effective the public 
sector is at managing PPPs. 
2.11 Conclusion 
PPPs may therefore be regarded as forms of governance aimed at improving public 
service delivery through the combination of public sector and private sector 
characteristics. As a result of the combined characteristics, PPPs require particular 
governance mechanisms to facilitate their application. There are various types of 
PPPs but their application is dependent upon services required from the private 
sector. Each type of PPP apportion  a certain level of risk on the public and private 
sector, however, PPPs with long contract periods apportion more risks to the private 
sector than the public sector. In addition risks are more profound in PPP projects that 
need a lot of capital and in PPPs projects in urban areas. Various benefits may 
ensue from PPPs, however, poor governance levels and inadequate institutional 
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capacities mar outcomes of PPPs. That as it may be, a number of management 
techniques exist that may enhance positive outcomes of PPPs if applied. 
























PPPs in South Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the conceptualisation of PPPs in South Africa. In so doing the 
chapter reviews the literature on PPPs in South Africa and examines the legislative 
and policy framework for PPPs in South Africa; the governance structure and 
processes of PPPs. The financing arrangements and the defining characteristics of 
PPPs are highlighted. It demonstrates that value-for-money; affordability; risk 
transfer to the private sector and the empowerment of black South Africans are 
regarded as the fundamental principles of PPP policies in South Africa.  
3.2 Background on PPPs in South Africa 
Since South Africa became a democracy, a number of PPPs have been 
implemented. For instance, in 2014 approximately 70 PPPs were registered with the 
National Treasury (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2014); 22 PPPs were signed in 
accordance with the provisions of Treasury Regulation 16 as at February, 2013 
(National Treasury PPP Unit, 2013) and between1994 and 2005, 300 PPPs were 
functional in municipalities (Farlam, 2005:  1). 
The literature on PPPs highlights the need to provide public services and 
infrastructure as the motivation behind PPPs while economic growth is touted as the 
main benefit to be accrued from PPPs. Poor institutional capacity and poor risk 
allocation are underscored as the key limiting factor to the implementation of PPPs.  
According to Burger (2006) the history of PPPs in post-apartheid South Africa dates 
to 1997 when a Task Team was appointed by the national cabinet to develop 
legislation and propose policy and institutional reforms to enable the employment of 
PPPs. The exercise of the Task Team culminated in various institutional and policy 
reforms including the establishment of a PPP Unit and experimentation with six PPP 
projects between 1997 and 2000 (Burger, 2006:  6).  
Fourie (2008) claims that interest in PPPs in South arose out of the necessity to 
provide public services and the need to reduce infrastructure backlogs. Fourie 
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argues that the government has the constitutional mandate to provide public services 
and infrastructure, however, as result of financial constraints the government is 
incapacitated from fulfilling this constitutional mandate. The Bill of Rights in Section 7 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (hereafter referred to as the 
Constitution) outlines several services which citizens must enjoy and the government 
is obliged to promote (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Fourie 
claims that the need for services and infrastructure is exacerbated by huge backlogs. 
According to Infrastructure Barometer Report for 2012, infrastructure and service 
backlogs in South Africa emanate from apartheid policies which confined provision of 
public services and infrastructure to white settlements and enabled limited 
infrastructure and services in black owned settlements (Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA), 2012:  18). Fourie contends that PPPs are therefore seen 
as a vehicle to provide public services and infrastructure as enshrined in the 
Constitution as well as address infrastructure backlogs (Fourie, 2008:  559).  
Chege (2001) adds that ongoing population growth and urbanisation have put 
pressure on the demand for public services. The population of South Africa has 
grown from 40.5 million in 1996 to 52.7 million in 2013 (Statistics South Africa, 2013:  
10). Furthermore 60% of the population now lives in urban areas (National Planning 
Commission, 2012:  105). Thus Chege argues that the population growth and 
urbanisation have exerted additional pressure on the demand for services 
necessitating government to look for alternative options to meet the demand and 
PPPs are one of those alternatives (Chege, 2001:  1). 
Nzimakwe (2006) asserts that the implementation of PPPs has led to the growth of 
new investments; job creation; improved infrastructure; skills and small businesses 
development. Nzimakwe confirms that developments arising from PPPs have, in 
turn, enhanced economic growth and extended service delivery to communities that 
were previously disadvantaged (Nzimakwe, 2006:  50). 
Burger (2006) notes that progress of PPPs in South Africa is marred by a lack of 
capacity to develop and implement PPPs by the various government departments. 
Burger argues that the slow pace in the implementation of PPPs is more a result of 
lack of capacity to manage the PPP process rather than the PPPs not being feasible.  
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Burger expounds that of the 45 PPPs that were in the pipeline in 2002, five were 
successfully concluded; 15 were still in the pipeline in 2006 and 25 were 
deregistered (Burger, 2006:  8). It is the contention of Burger that PPP projects that 
eventually get deregistered, in most cases, meet the criteria for PPP procurement 
but progression is inhibited by a lack of capacity within the department to see the 
projects through the various phases of PPPs in South Africa (Burger 2006:  8).  
Another limitation for PPPs in South Africa emanate from poor risk allocation.  
Ahwireng-Obeng and Mokgohlwa (2002) research findings on risk allocation in PPPs 
in South Africa concluded that socio-political, regulatory, financial and legal risks‟ 
allocation are inequitably distributed between the public and the private sectors while 
the principle of  “best party to manage the risk, bears the risk” is not religiously 
followed (Ahwireng-Obeng and Mokgohlwa, 2002:  38). Ahwireng-Obeng and 
Mokgohlwa contend that the inequitable distribution and allocation has consequently 
led private firms to shunning PPPs and in cases where PPPs have been 
implemented, the contracts are rigid and difficult to accommodate changes 
effectively making PPP implementation taxing (Ahwireng-Obeng and Mokgohlwa, 
2002). 
It seems then that the accumulation of public services and infrastructure needs, 
compounded by financial constraints in the public sector; growing population and 
urbanisation have led to the government adopting the use of PPPs in South Africa. 
While in some cases, improved economic prospects and service delivery have 
accrued from such PPPs, inadequate institutional capacity and poor risk allocation 
hinder progress of PPPs in South Africa.  
3.3 The Legislative and Policy Framework for PPPs in South Africa 
This section will present the legislative and policy framework for PPPs in South 
Africa. Any legislation, policy or programme on PPPs needs to be aligned with the 
principles provided for in the Constitution, (The Constitution of the Republic of South 




when an organ of the state in the national, provincial and local 
sphere of government, or any other institution identified in national 
legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in 
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective 
Besides the Constitution there are a number of other Acts and policy documents that 
have implications for the PPPs in South Africa. Table 3.1 summarises the key Acts 
and their relevance to PPPs, while Table 3.2 summarise general government 
policies and strategies that are relevant to PPPs.  
Table 3.1: Legislation Pertaining to PPPs in South Africa 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) (Act 1 of 1999): Treasury Regulation 
16 
Provides for procurement of PPPs at national and provincial levels of government. It 
gives powers to Accounting officers to enter into PPPs on behalf of public entities 
thereby making Accounting Officers accountable for PPPs outcomes.  
Municipal Systems Act (MSA), (Act 32 of 2000); Local Government: Municipal 
Finance Management Act (Act 56 of 2003): Municipal PPPs Regulations 
Provides for the procurement of PPPs in local government.  
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act  (Act 17 of 2003) 
Provides for economic empowerment of black people. It defines black people as 
South African Africans, Coloureds and Indians. It also gives powers to the Minister of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) to issue codes of good practice and transformation 
charters; establishment of the BBBEE Advisory Council. The codes of good practice 
provides for preferential treatment of black people in the procurement of public 
services while the advisory council recommends to the minister of Trade and 





Table 3.2: Policy Documents Pertaining to PPPs in South Africa 
Strategic Framework for Delivering Public Service through PPPs (2000) 
This framework identifies the major impediments to the successful implementation of 
PPPs in the national and provincial departments. It highlights Acts, regulations and 
institutional practices and procedures which need reform to strengthen 
implementation of PPPs. It also provides strategies that support implementation of 
PPPs in the national and provincial government departments. 
A Strategy for BBBEE (2003) 
This policy document provides a strategy of how to develop a code of good practice 
and the use of scorecards in PPPs to ensure the empowerment of the black people 
and black owned businesses in the PPP process. 
The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (MSPs) (2004) 
The White Paper provides guidance to municipalities, service providers and 
investors on the delivery of municipal services through MSPs. It provides the 
framework within which resources of public institutions, Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the private 
sector may be leveraged to meet developmental needs of South Africa through 
PPPs.  
The National Development Plan (hereafter referred to as NDP): Our Future – 
Make it Work 2030 (NDP 2030)  
The NDP was drafted by the National Planning Commission, an advisory body to the 
government, aimed at establishing a holistic socio-economic development plan for 
South Africa. The Commission which was instituted in 2010 produced a Diagnostic 
Report in 2011 which concluded that the slow progress of South Africa was due to 
poor policy implementation and the absence of partnerships between the public, 
private and civic sector (National Planning Commission, 2012:  15). The NDP 
proposes the involvement of the private sector in order to achieve active participation 
of citizens in developmental initiatives; accelerated and inclusive economy and 
improvement of infrastructure.  
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The legislative and policy frameworks therefore “supports and reflects government 
policy objectives for delivering infrastructure and public services, in line with its 
constitutional mandate” (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2007:  8) and encourages use 
of PPPs to deliver the infrastructure and public services needs of South Africa as 
identified in the NDP. 
3.4 Governance of PPPs in South Africa 
The key governance issues of PPPs in South Africa are spread amongst the PPP 
Unit (located in the National Treasury), the different government departments 
intending to adopt PPPs and the Auditor General (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 
2007). The different roles each of the mentioned entities play in PPPs are discussed 
below.  
According section 16.3 of the PFMA (Act 1 of 1999), all PPPs are subject to approval 
by the PPP Unit, located in the National Treasury, except in situations where such 
responsibility is delegated to provincial treasuries. Government departments are 
compelled to request National Treasury approval before any PPP contract can be 
signed (PFMA Act 1 of 1999: Treasury Regulation 16). The PPP Unit  insists that a 
PPP proposal must demonstrate affordability, value for money and risk transfer to 
the private party as well as empowerment of black people right from the initial 
identification of the PPP proposal throughout its implementation if the PPP is to be 
approved (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2007).  
During a roundtable discussion with cabinet ministers and high-level government 
officials in 2010, it was argued that the PPP Unit in South Africa plays technical and 
regulatory roles in PPPs (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2010:  slide 21). Therefore 
the PPP Unit plays an advisory role for government departments, but also ensures 
PPPs compliance with the legislative and policy frameworks.  However, individual 
government departments remain responsible for the management functions of the 
particular PPP in question (Department of Finance, 2000:  5). 
Government departments must appoint an Accounting Officer in charge of the overall 
PPPs.  The day-to-day management of the PPPs is the delegated responsibility of 
project teams specifically appointed for the purpose by the Accounting Officers 
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(Department of Finance, 2000:  11).  While legislation on PPPs mandates the 
National Treasury and the provincial treasuries when sanctioned by the National 
Treasury, and the municipal councils to approve procurement through PPPs, the 
Accounting Officers in respective government bodies are the ones that sign PPP 
agreements on behalf of departments (PFMA (Act 1 of 1999): Treasury Regulation 
16; MFMA (Act 56 of 2003): Municipal PPPs Regulations). 
Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for Accounting Officers to appoint transaction 
advisor in case of inadequate institutional capacity to develop and negotiate PPPs 
and PPP agreements. According to PPP Manual Module 3, Transaction advisor “is a 
consortium of professionals with appropriate skills and experience to assist 
institutions with the preparation and conclusion of a PPP agreement” (National 
Treasury, 2004:  9). 
In South Africa most PPPs entail the creation of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to 
operate the PPP. SPV often necessitates the setting up of a single business entity in 
the form of a private party. The SPV is responsible for overseeing the technical 
aspects of the project. The SPV itself can subcontract for services or goods and that 
is where PPPs offer the ideal opportunity for BBBEE through preferential 
procurement (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2007).  
Section 16.4 of PFMA Regulation 16 mandates individual government departments 
proposing the PPPs to conduct feasibility studies before PPPs are implemented. 
Feasibility study ascertains operational and strategic benefits of the PPP to the 
institution and government as well as areas for achievement of BBBEE. Upon 
obtaining necessary approvals from the PPP Unit or the relevant delegated 
provincial treasury, the actual PPP procurement and the contract management of 
PPPs is the obligation of government departments employing the PPP (PFMA Act 1 
of 1999: Treasury Regulation 16).   
The office of the Auditor General is another critical department in the implementation 
of PPPs in South Africa. Section 188 the Constitution mandates the Auditor General 
to annually audit and report on financial statements and financial management of 
national and provincial departments; municipalities and other entities provided for in 
any legislation (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). PPP Manual 
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Module 7 states that “while a PPP changes the means of delivering services, the 
institution is still accountable for ensuring that services are delivered and that state 
property is used properly (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2004:  1). Thus the auditing 
process is imperative in PPPs.  
Institutional governance arrangements for PPPs in South Africa, therefore, are not a 
preserve of one entity. A variety of bodies play different roles in the governance of 
PPP.  
3.5 PPPs Financing in South Africa 
According to the Standardised Public-Private Partnerships Provisions for 2004, 
funding for PPPs in South Africa originate from three main sources and these are 
project financing; corporate financing and capital contribution by a government  
institution. In project financing the private party to the PPP sources debt and equity 
to finance the PPP; in corporate financing the private party funds the PPPs from own 
resources and in capital contribution by a government institution, the institution 
intending to apply PPP and/or other public sector contribute significantly towards the 
cost of the PPPs (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2004). 
Figure 3.1below illustrates the generic PPP structure and highlights the types of 
financial sources SPVs may have access to which are equity, shareholding, loan 
agreements and or debt. 
Figure 3.1: Example of PPP Financial Arrangement: South Africa 
 
Source: National Treasury, 2004:  6 
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The significance of Figure 3.1 above is that the PPP agreement is between the 
government and the private party (or SPV).  The latter is responsible for the 
management of all subcontract agreements with other private entities.  Government 
may or may not contribute to the project with some of its own revenue sources, but in 
essence, PPPs are predominantly financed by the private parties involved.  The 
regulatory framework for PPPs in South Africa, and the PPP Unit at the National 
Treasury aims to ensure that PPP agreements promote black economic 
empowerment through, for example, approving the establishment of SPVs that meet 
such criteria. 
3.6 Types of PPPs in South Africa 
In South Africa PPPs are defined as “a contract between a public institution and a 
private party where 
 the private party performs an institutional function or uses state property in 
terms of output specifications 
 substantial project risk (financial, technical, operational) is transferred the 
private party 
 the private party benefits through unitary payments from government 
budgets and/or user fees,” (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2007:  5) 
There are five main types of PPPs in South Africa. The five types are service 
contracts; management contracts; lease; build-operate-transfer (BOT) and 
concession (Department of Finance, 2000:  6). As will be seen in Table 3.3 below, 
the five PPP types may be applied in various functional areas of government 
departments and may range from one year to thirty years. Table 3.3 illustrates the 
different types of PPPs; the duration for each type; the means of payment to the 
contractor; the type of services which the private party may perform under each 





Table 3.3: Types of PPPs in South Africa 
 
Source: Department of Finance, 2000:  6 
According to Department of Finance, service contracts are the most simple to apply 
due to their short durations (1-3 years) and nature of services (repairs, maintenance 
and laundry) on the other hand BOT and concessions are complex since they call for 
substantial capital investment and are long term (over 15 years). Furthermore, lease 
and concessions generate revenue for government in form of rent and concession 
fees respectively. BOT may generate fees for government, in the long term (after 
transfer of facility to government) in form of user fees (National Treasury, 2004:  6).  
3.7 The PPP Project Phases in South Africa 
The PPP Manual for national and provincial governments, Module 1 outlines six 
phases through PPPs in South Africa go through. The six phases are inception, 
feasibility study, procurement, development, delivery and exit (National Treasury, 
PPP Unit, 2004:  II). Some of the main activities for each of the phases are run 
through in Table 3.4 below. 
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Table 3.4: PPP Phases in South Africa 
No. Phase Activities 
1 Inception 
Registration of the PPP project with the relevant treasury, 
appointment of project officer and appointment of 
transaction officer. 
2 Feasibility study 
Performance of needs analysis, options analysis, project 
due diligence, value assessment, economic valuation and 
preparation of procurement plan  
3 Procurement 
Preparation of bid documents, preparation of draft PPP 
agreement, pre-qualification of parties, issuance of 
request for proposals, receipt of bids, , selection of 
preferred bidder, preparation of value-for-money report, 
negotiation with preferred bidder and conclusion of PPP 
agreement management plan 
4 Development 
Measurement of outputs, monitoring and regulation of 
performance, consultations and conflict resolutions  
5 Delivery Submission of annual progress reports, monitoring  
6 Exit 
Examination of the PPP by the Auditor-General 
Development of options for continuity of service 
Employee transfer plans 
Closure Event 
Adapted from: National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2004:  II 
The PPP project cycle is underpinned by four specific points in time during which the 
national and provincial governments‟ departments contemplating applying PPPs are 
under obligation to seek approvals from the National Treasury or the relevant 
provincial treasury. The first approval is sought after submission of the Feasibility 
Study report but before proceeding to the procurement phase; the second approval 
is sought upon submission of the bid documents but before issuance of the bid 
documents to prospective bidders; the third approval is sought on submission of the 
Evaluation of Bids report but before the appointment of the preferred bidder and the 
last approval is sought on tendering the PPP Agreement Management Plan but 
before entering into PPP agreement with the preferred bidder ((PFMA (Act 1 of 
1999): Treasury Regulation 16). 
Section 40 of the Constitution stipulates that government in South Africa is made up 
of three spheres and these are national, provincial and local spheres (The 
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Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Thus while the PPP processes 
for PPPs implementation in the three spheres is in most respects similar there are a 
number of differences. The differences hinge on the governing legislation, the source 
of PPPs‟ approval, and the involvement of the public.  
Whereas national and provincial governments are guided by the PFMA (Act 1 of 
1999: Regulation 16) in the procurement of PPPs, Municipal Service Delivery and 
PPP Guidelines of 2007 indicates that local government is guided by legislation 
found in the MSA (Act 32 of 2000), MFMA (Act 56 of 2003: Municipal PPPs 
Regulations and Municipal Supply Chain Regulations) (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 
2007:  1). Despite the differences, nevertheless, all legislation whether at national, 
provincial or local government is underpinned by section 217 of the Constitution 
which mandates transparency and competitiveness in public procurement (The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Another point of departure between the national and the provincial governments on 
one hand and the local government on the other in the implementation of PPPs is 
the source of  authorization of PPPs. Whereas approval to implement PPPs in the 
national and the provincial departments comes from National Treasury, approval for 
local government PPP procurement is granted by municipal councils. National 
Treasury only provides views and recommendations on the municipal PPPs 
(National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2004; National Treasury PPP Unit, 2007). 
Lastly, municipalities are mandated to notify, consult and seek comments from the 
public, the National Treasury, the relevant treasury and the Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta) on the Feasibility Study 
report and the Contract Management Plan sixty days before the meetings at which 
the municipal council may approve the respective documents. Additionally, in the 
case of PPPs involving water, sanitation and electricity, municipalities are compelled 
to consult and seek views of relevant national government line departments. 
Municipalities are under obligation to allow thirty days for comments; national and 




Thus the establishment of PPPs in South Africa goes through a mandatory sequence 
with numerous checks and has to meet a set of legislative and policy requirements 
before a formal PPP contract can be drafted between a public institution and a 
private party. 
3.8 Black Economic Empowerment in PPPs in South Africa 
The integration of BBBEE elements in public procurement through PPPs is central to 
any procurement in South Africa as attested in the legislations and policy 
frameworks discussed in the first part of this chapter. According to the Code of Good 
Practice for BBBEE in PPPs of 2004 incorporation of BBBEE elements is mandatory 
for all PPP processes including in the feasibility; the procurement of the transaction 
advisor and the private party to a PPP project (National Treasury, 2004:  6). The 
Code of Good Practice for BBBEE in PPPs specifies areas for the BBBEE 
incorporation in PPPs. Figure 3.2 below shows expected areas for the BBBEE 
incorporation in PPPs.  
Figure 3.2: Expected BBBEE Elements in PPPs  
 
Source: National Treasury, 2004:  10 
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Figure 3.2 above indicates that black people are expected to be incorporated in 
PPPs as shareholders of the private party; in the management and control of the 
SPV as managers and employees and in the provision of services to the PPP as 
subcontractors or suppliers. Additionally PPPs are anticipated to provide 
employment and skills to black people as well as conduct social corporate functions 
in the vicinity of the project. 
According to the Code of Good Practice for BBBEE in PPPs specially designed 
balanced scorecards are used to evaluate BBBEE integration in the transaction 
advisor and the private party to the PPP project (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2004:  
6). Table 3.5 below depicts the scorecard. 
Table 3.5:  PPP BBBEE Balanced Scorecard 





A: Private Party equity  20% 
A1: Black Equity 40%  
A2: Active Equity 55% of A1  
A3: Cost of Black Equity Value for money  
A4: Timing of project cash flows to Black 
Shareholders 
Early and ongoing  
   
B: Private Party management and 
employment 
 15% 
B1: Black Management Control Commensurate with A1 and 
A2 
 
B2: Black Women in Management Control 15% of B1  
B3: Employment equity Compliant with law  
B4: Skills development 1% of payroll  
   
C: Subcontracting  50% 
C1: Capital expenditure cash flow to Black 
People and/or Black Enterprises 
30%  
C2: Operating expenditure cash flow to Black 
People and/or Black Enterprises 
30%  
C3: Black Management Control 25%  
C4: Black Women in Management Control 15% of C3  
C5: Employment equity Compliant with law  
C6: Skills development 1% of payroll  
C7: Procurement to Black Enterprise SMMEs 30%  
   
D: Local socio-economic impact Sustainable, effective plan 15% 
Source: National Treasury, 2004:  26 
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The scorecard attaches value to each BBBEE element expected in the PPPs. 
According to the 2004 Code of Good Practice for BBBEE in PPPs, bids for 
transaction advisor must score 50% or above while bids for the private party must 
achieve a score of 60% and above to be considered for the next round of bid 
evaluation process (National Treasury, 2004:  6).  
It may therefore be concluded that while it is mandatory for PPPs in South Africa to 
conform to the Defining Characteristics of PPPs in South Africa discussed above, 
integration of BBBEE‟ elements in PPPs is not only a legislative requirement but also 
a defining characteristic of PPPs in South Africa. 
3.9 Conclusion 
The role of PPPs in the delivery of public services and infrastructure in South Africa 
gained increased government cognisance in 1997 and since then several PPPs have 
been implemented across all the three spheres of government. Various legislative 
and policy frameworks have been developed to enable the application of PPPs. 
Equally a number of institutions and processes have been put in place to facilitate 
the regulation and implementation of PPPs. While there are three choices of means 
for financing PPPs, it appears project financing is the preferred means of financing 
PPPs in South Africa. The emphasis by legislation and policy directives on PPPs on 
„affordability; value for money and appropriate risk transfer to the private party‟; 
approval of PPPs by the National Treasury in respect of national and provincial 
government PPPs and municipal councils in case of municipal PPPs and signing of 
PPPs by Accounting Officers provides the defining features for PPPs in South Africa. 
However, it is clear that the integration of BBBEE elements in PPPs is yet another 
critical defining characteristic of PPPs in South Africa. 
The next chapter provides the background to the case study for this thesis, which is 
study of the Gautrain PPP.  The chapter will examine the public transport challenges 






Public Transport in South Africa 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish the broad context of the case study 
component of this paper which is an analysis of the Gautrain PPP.  This chapter 
therefore presents an overview of the transport sector in South Africa and the 
institutions responsible for the various segments of transport in South Africa. The 
chapter details the main means of public transport and corresponding infrastructure. 
Challenges in public transport and the limitations of the existing public transport 
infrastructure are highlighted. The chapter also discusses the key legislative and 
policy frameworks for transport and demonstrates why government has considered 
the use of PPPs as a potential governance approach to the provision of public 
transport.  
4.2 The Public Transport Mandate in South Africa 
Economic infrastructure, of which transport is an integral part, is fundamental to the 
economic development of a country (Perkins, nd:  25). In order to enable the critical 
role of transport in the economic development of South Africa, various Acts confer 
responsibilities for transport in a number of parastatals under the ambit of the DoT.  
According to the DoT‟s 2012/13 Annual Report, the Department fulfills its mandate 
by developing policies, strategies and regulations on transport. The DoT is also 
responsible for capacity building, monitoring, investment and the development of 
transport programmes (DoT, 2013:  5). 
To make the role of the DoT possible, the DoT is supported by twelve parastatals. 
Table 4.1 below summarises the different state entities that report to the DoT and 






Table 4.1: Entities Reporting to the DoT   
 
Source: Department of Transport, 2013:  10 
Table 4.1 above indicates that the entities that report to the DoT are spread across a 
wide range of transport sectors namely air, road, rail and water. For instance, the 
Airports Companies of South Africa operates the country‟s airports; the South African 
National Road Agency (SANRAL) manages and controls the national road system; 
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the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) operates the commuter rail 
system and the National Ports Regulator oversees some ports in South Africa. 
Additionally, the entities that report to the DoT play a variety of other roles. The 
functions played by the different entities can be regulatory.  For example the South 
African Civil Aviation Authority regulates aviation; coordination manifested in cross-
border services for road transport provided by the Cross-Border Road Traffic 
Agency; operational exemplified in the rail and bus passenger services provided by 
PRASA and arbitration evident in the adjudication of road traffic offences by the 
Road Traffic Infringement Agency. 
The mandate of DoT is hence extensive and their oversight spread across various 
parastatals, each with their own vested functions. 
4.3 Public Transport Services and Infrastructure in South Africa 
Movement of people or goods from one destination to another necessitates one form 
of transport or another. According to the National Household Travel survey 
conducted in 2013, the main modes of public transport in South Africa are taxis, 
buses and trains (Statistics South Africa, 2013). This section of the chapter will 
examine the challenges the commuting public experience to access public transport 
services as well as the challenges the government  institutions mandated to provide 
or facilitate public transport face in the fulfillment of their mandates. 
4.3.1 Public Transport Services in South Africa  
Walters (2008) claims that the DoT has since 1996 intervened to improve already 
existing public transport as well as extending public transport services (Walters, 
2008:  98). Walters cites the replacement of unroadworthy taxis through the taxi 
recapitalization programme, the objective of which is to enhance safety and reliability 
of taxi services.  In addition, a return of government bus service subsidies, which 
reduces the cost to the commuting public to access bus services.  According to The 
State of South Africa‟s Economic Report for 2012 another DoT intervention was the 
delinking of rail passenger commuter services from freight services, which was 
aimed at improving the accessibility for passengers to rail services (DBSA, 2012:  
12).  However, despite the interventions, the literature on public transport services in 
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South Africa highlights the general public‟s ongoing limited access to public 
transport.  The National Planning Commission claims that inefficiency and 
unreliability of public transport remains a key challenge in South Africa (National 
Planning Commission, 2012:  183). 
According to the National Household Travel survey of 2013 the difficulty in accessing 
public transport is one of the challenges overwhelming public transport services in 
South Africa. For example, the survey highlights that 94% of the learners who use 
public transport to get to places of learning walk up to 15 minutes to access public 
transport (Statistics South Africa, 2013:  30) while 15% of the workers who use 
public transport walk for more than 15 minutes to access public transport (Statistics 
South Africa, 2013:  53). Having reached public transport boarding places, 95% of 
the learners and 10.3% of the workers wait up to 15 minutes for public transport, 
(Statistics South Africa, 2013:  31;55). The survey maintains that the challenge to 
access public transport is more acute in train services, where 34.5% of the public 
walk for more than 15 minutes to access trains (Statistics South Africa, 2013:  54). 
Poor access to public transport services have in turn made the travelling public 
become discontented with the levels of public transport services.  
In addition, public transport services are marred by inefficiency and unreliability, 
particularly train services. While the National Household Travel survey states that 
vehicle overload; road traffic congestion; crime at public transport boarding stations 
and irresponsible driving particularly by taxi drivers as some of the problems that 
have put into disrepute public transport services (Statistics South Africa, 2013:  92), 
the 2011 Utatu Labour Report highlights that train travel is subjugated by high 
percentages of delays and cancelled train trips. The delays and cancellations are 
attributed to the extensive breakdown in railway signaling and electricity systems 
(Utatu, 2011:  2). Consequently the public has become wary of utilising public 
transport despite its availability. 
4.3.2 Road Transport 
According to the 2011 Infrastructure Report Card for South Africa, the management 
and control of public roads in South Africa is shared amongst SANRAL; metropolitan 
municipalities; provincial road authorities and municipalities. While metropolitan 
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municipalities, provinces and municipalities are in-charge of road networks within 
their jurisdictions, SANRAL is in-charge of the national road network (SAICE, 2011:  
20). 
The 2012 State of South Africa‟s Economic Infrastructure Report states that the road 
network in South Africa comprises of approximately 750,000 kilometers.  According 
to the Report 140,000 kilometers of the road network is „unproclaimed‟. DBSA 
defines „unproclaimed‟ road network “as road network which is not recorded in the 
official road inventories and has no institution mandated to maintain or upgrade it” 
(DBSA, 2012:  47). Table 4.2 below displays the division of the road network 
amongst the four authorities responsible for roads mentioned above.  
Table 4.2:  Extent of the South African Road Network by Authority 
 Paved Gravel 
Road Authority Length (km) % Length (km) % 
SANRAL 16, 170 10.5 0 0.0 
Province roads 48, 176 31.3 136, 640 20.3 
Metropolitan (9) 51, 682 33.6 14, 461 2.1 
Municipalities 37, 691 24.5 302, 158 44.8 
Total proclaimed roads 153, 719  454, 000  
Unproclaimed (estimate) 0 0.0 140, 000 32.8 
Total 153, 719 100.0 593, 259 100.0 
Source: DBSA, 2012:  47 
Table 4.2 above shows that close to half of the road network is under the 
management and control of municipalities. Again, the proportion of the 
„unproclaimed‟ road network is substantial when compared against the road 




4.3.2.1 Challenges: Road Transport 
The key challenges identified in the road transport sector are the lack of qualified 
engineers to lead in the development and maintenance of road infrastructure; the 
poor state of roads; vehicle overloading and financial constraints.  
SAICE (2011) claims that the absence of engineering professionals to lead in the 
development and maintenance of the road infrastructure has led to reduced benefits 
such as improved delivery of basic services which could ensue from road transport 
(SAICE, 2011:  11). According to SAICE the number of engineers is insufficient and 
is dominated by ageing whites. SAICE augments that the skills survey it conducted 
in 2007 revealed that only 200 municipalities out of 283 had civil engineers while 48 
municipalities had mere civil technicians performing duties of engineers (SAICE, 
2011:  11).  
In addition, the efficiency of the road infrastructure is limited by the obsolescence of 
the road infrastructure. SAICE (2011) contends that 80% of the national road 
network, despite being in good condition, has outlived the 20-year structural design 
life span it was intended to last while 50% of the provincial‟s and 30% of the 
municipal‟s gravel road network is in poor to very poor conditions due to lack of 
maintenance (SAICE, 2011:  7). Besides part of the road network being obsolete and 
in poor state due to lack of maintenance, SANRAL argues that the other source for 
the poor state of roads is vehicle overload. SANRAL claims that R1 billion is spent 
every year on road maintenance costs arising from vehicle overloading (SANRAL, 
2012:  33). Subsequently the public is subjected to negative outcomes that originate 
from poor road infrastructure such as increased vehicle maintenance and fuel costs 
(SAICE, 2011:  21).  
Another challenge impeding the provision of road infrastructure is financial 
constraints to enable maintenance of the roads. DBSA (2012) argues in The State of 
South Africa‟s Economic Infrastructure Report that despite the national government 
increasing funding for public transport since 2003 and introducing Provincial Road 
Maintenance Grant (PRMG) to assist provincial governments in road maintenance, 
the available funding for public transport is still 60% short of the required funding 
levels (DBSA, 2012:  57). According to SAICE, six to eighteen times more may be 
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spent to maintain a road when initial maintenance is delayed by five years (SAICE, 
2011:  21). In view of the age of the national road network and poor road 
maintenance regime in the provincial and local governments it may therefore be 
concluded that substantial amounts of money is required to upgrade the road 
network in South Africa. 
4.3.3 Rail Transport 
According to the State of South Africa‟s Infrastructure Report for 2012 rail transport 
and the construction of the rail network in South Africa was initiated by private 
companies in 1859. The Report points out that the rail network was built to support 
mining, heavy cargo and large scale agriculture industries (DBSA, 2012:  12). 
Perkins (nd) maintains that most of South Africa‟s current rail line was built by 1930 
and that the following years were mainly devoted to increasing the numbers of train 
locomotives, goods stocks and coaching stocks (Perkins, nd:  28). Table 4.3 below 
summarizes the levels of rail infrastructure and services by 2003. 
Table: 4.3 Rail Infrastructure and Services in South Africa: 2003 
 
Source: Perkins, (nd):  28 
Table 4.3 above, illustrates that the period after 1980 witnessed a decline in rail 
investment and in some instances a fall in the number of the existing infrastructure. 
For example, route kilometers dropped from 21,079 in 1995 to 20,796 in 2003 and 
the coaching stock decreased from 10,704 in 1980 to 6,588 in 2003. While the route 
kilometers have picked up to reach 21,000 kilometers by 2012 (DBSA, 2012:  21) the 
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coaching stock investment has continued to decrease. During 2005/6 there were 
only 4,660 coaches out of which 1,300 were out of service (Utatu, 2011:  2). 
The current management of the rail network is divided between Transnet and 
PRASA. While Transnet is responsible for freight services, PRASA manages 
passenger commuter services (DBSA, 2012:  12). PRASA therefore has more 
bearing on public transport. 
PRASA was established in 2009 and took over from the South African Rail 
Commuter Corporation (SARRC) which up to that point in time responsible for rail 
operations for commuters (DBSA, 2012:  12). The aim of government in establishing 
PRASA was to improve accessibility of rail transport through provision of integrated 
rail passenger services (PRASA, 2013:  9). The rail commuter functions of PRASA 
are accomplished through three entities: Metrorail, which runs urban passenger 
services; Shosholoza Meyl, which operates long distance rail passenger services; 
and Autopax bus services, which acts as feeder service for the rail commuter 
services (DBSA, 2012:  154). 
Besides operating the passenger services, PRASA operates and own approximately 
400 train stations and shares rail tracks with Transnet, mostly tracks located in cities 
(DBSA, 2012:  12).   
4.3.3.1 Challenges: Rail Transport 
The key challenges pervading the rail transport are obsolescence of the rail 
infrastructure; the sharing of rail infrastructure between Transnet and PRASA; the 
outdated design of the rail infrastructure and financial constraints.  
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of PRASA affirms in the Labour Report of 2011 
that the last rail line was constructed in 1980 while 83% of the rail fleet operates on 
1956 technology. Furthermore, 84% of the signaling system is obsolete. 
Consequently, most of the fleet and signaling system fail to operate to the optimal 
levels leading to delayed or cancelled rail trips (Utatu, 2011:  2). 
The sharing of rail tracks between freight services and passenger services is another 
debilitating factor to the rail commuter and passenger industry.  For instance, inter-
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city rail services operated by Shosholoza Meyl are heavily dependent on tracks and 
maintenance facilities owned by Transnet (DBSA, 2012:  16). The DBSA argues that 
Transnet as the owner of most rail tracks prioritises freight services above PRASA‟s 
passenger services. As a result, passenger train services are deluged by 
cancellations and confined to average maximum speeds of 70 kilometers per hour 
emblematic of freight speeds. The DBSA contends the existing state of affairs not 
only leads to delays but also longer travel times (DBSA, 2012:  16).  
According to the State of South Africa‟s Economic Infrastructure Report (2012), the 
mining and agriculture industries the rail network was meant to serve when it was 
first constructed was typified by long distances between residences and places of 
work. The rail infrastructure was limited to facilitating movement of black workers 
from places of residence to work places. The black people were confined in 
settlements far from cities and there was no integration between the rail transport 
and other modes of transport. As a result of this background commuters now have to 
walk long distances or make several transport connections with other modes of 
transport in order to access trains and thereafter reach final destinations. The 
walking and the interconnections are not only inconveniencing and expensive but 
they are also time-consuming (DBSA, 2012:  20). 
Financial limitation is another challenge to the provision of public rail services and 
infrastructure. The DBSA (2012) claims that PRASA only manages to raise 30% of 
the required operational costs from the services it provides and relies on government 
subvention to close the gap. While the limited funding impedes PRASA from carrying 
out services effectively, DBSA argues that the practice is not only unsustainable but 
also unachievable in the long term given government‟s financial constraints as well 
(DBSA, 2012:  21). 
The challenges in rail transport are made worse by lack of policy specific to rail 
transport (DBSA, 2012:  22). According to the Annual Report for PRASA 2012/13 
PRASA depends on the National Transport Policy; Public Transport Strategy; 
National Land Transport Act and the Green Paper (draft policy) on Rail for legislative 
and policy guidance (PRASA, 2013:  11). DBSA argues that though the mentioned 
policies and legislations could be relevant to rail transport, the documents fall short 
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of addressing pertinent issues such as institutional structures which are specific to 
rail transport (DBSA, 2012:  22). 
It is against the backdrop of these challenges of public transport service and 
infrastructure delivery that legislative and policy documents propose various 
initiatives to address the challenges.  
4.4 The National Land Transport Act (NLTA) (Act 5 of 2009). 
The key legislation pertaining to public transport is the National Land Transport Act 
(NLTA) (Act 5 of 2009). The Act provides for the conditions of land transport which 
national, provincial and local spheres of government must comply with. In essence, 
the municipal sphere of government is allocated the vast bulk of the public transport 
responsibilities with provincial and national government taking a more strategic and 
oversight role. 
Section 11 of the NLTA allocates transport responsibilities to the three spheres of 
government and these are broadly divided into strategic, regulatory and operational 
functions. The national sphere of government is primarily responsible for developing 
national strategic frameworks, guidelines, standards, regulations and draft model 
contracts. The provincial sphere of government is responsible for formulating 
provincial transport policy and strategy so that it is in line with the framework of 
national policy and strategy. These provincial strategies and policies in turn provide 
the framework for municipal policies and plans. 
 
Furthermore, the national and provincial spheres are given capacity building and co-
ordination responsibilities. The national sphere is responsible for capacitating and 
monitoring provinces and municipalities that lack the capacity or resources to 
perform their transport functions as well as engaging with other national government 
departments that have an impact on transport issues. Similarly the provincial sphere 
is responsible for co-ordinating municipalities in order to ensure that land transport is 
efficiently executed in the province. The Act also gives the provincial sphere 
responsibility for ensuring that municipalities that lack capacity are given the 




4.5 Policy on Public Transport  
The NDP provides some important policy directives for the transport sector. 
The pertinent section on PPPs in the NDP is chapter 9. In the chapter, the NDP 
supports development of affordable, reliable and safe transport services and 
infrastructure that link all geographical locations and creation of urban transit 
systems.  The NDP suggests prioritization of developments in the transport sector 
and the conduct of analyses to determine best options for delivery of services and 
infrastructure – either through private or public means. 
The NDP encourages the promulgation of enabling regulations to enable the private 
sector to participate in the delivery of transport services and infrastructure where it is 
beneficial to do so. The NDP also advocates for collaboration of efforts between 
government agencies and the private sector in the expansion or development of 
huge infrastructure and in the provision of rail-transit services. 
Furthermore, the NDP promotes funding of infrastructure developments that 
generate revenue through balance sheets of the government agencies and the 
private institutions in carrying out infrastructure developments. 
It may therefore be argued that pronunciation in the NDP supports the use of PPPs 
in the delivery of public transport services and infrastructure, including that of rail-
transit services.  
4.6 PPPs in the Transport Sector 
PPPs have indeed been employed in the transport sector.  
According to the Annual report for SANRAL for 2012, SANRAL entered into a 30 
year concession contract with the Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire (Pty) 
Limited in 2001.  The PPP contract arrangement obliged Bakwena to “design, 
finance, construct, operate and maintain” two stretches of toll roads with a combined 
length of 585 kilometres in Pretoria. SANRAL claims that the PPP has resulted in an 
expanded and improved network as evidenced by additional carriage ways on the 
roads and upgrades of some single lanes to dual lanes. Additionally, SANRAL claims 
that the PPP has led to BBBEE achievement through the employment of black 
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people and support to local communities. For instance, between 2011 and 2012 one 
thousand black people were employed in various positions and since 2002 Bakwena 
has been providing food support to Leseding Care Center situated along one of the 
roads under the PPP (SANRAL, 2012).  
Again the Eastern Cape provincial government collaborated with Fleet Africa Eastern 
Cape (Pty) where the latter was responsible for the management of fleet for the 
provincial government through a management contract which was signed in 2003. 
The PPP agreement was for a period of five years (National Treasury, 2011:  2). 
According to a PPPs Benchmarking study of 2005 commissioned by the Department 
of Economic Development of KwaZulu Natal provincial government, the objective of 
the PPP was to enable the Eastern Cape provincial government access private 
sector efficiency and skills in fleet management. The study claims that the provincial 
government realised R50 million from sale of old assets through the PPP 
arrangement (KwaZulu Natal Provincial Government, Department of Economic 
Development, 2005:  63). 
4.7 Conclusion 
While government has made provision for public transport services and infrastructure 
numerous challenges remain in the public transport sector. The public transport 
challenges border on inefficient and ineffective public transport services as well as 
inadequate infrastructure.  This has resulted in a significant number of the public 
relying on taxi‟s and private cars for transport. Consequently the roads have become 
congested. The rail sector which could relieve road congestion is itself so engrossed 
in operational and technical challenges.  The next chapter will examine in more detail 
the Gautrain Rapid Rail Link which is one of the PPPs being implemented to 








Case Study: The Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link PPP  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link (or better known as the 
Gautrain) PPP. The background to the establishment of the Gautrain PPP and its 
geographic location are described. The chapter then explores the technical and 
structural aspects of the Gautrain such as what type of a PPP it is; the rationale for 
the PPP and the project cycle for the PPP. The parties and financing arrangements 
for the project are highlighted. The chapter also underscores some of the issues 
which have arisen in the course of the implementation of the Gautrain. The 
arrangements put in place to formalize the Gautrain and the outcomes that have 
ensued from the PPP are demonstrated in order to illustrate some of the governance 
issues. 
5.2 Background and Geographical Location of the Gautrain PPP 
The Gautrain PPP is located in the Gauteng province, one of the nine provinces in 
South Africa. The Gauteng province possesses several distinctive characteristics 
that economically and socially distinguish it from other provinces. These 
characteristics include land size; level of government administrative composition; 
population size; employee remuneration; contribution to the national economy and 
industry size. 
The Gauteng province is the smallest of the nine provinces in South Africa with a 
land area of 1.4% of the total national land area, (Statistics South Africa, 2011: 13). 
However, the Gauteng province is home to two important cities. The cities are 
Pretoria which is the administrative capital of South Africa and Johannesburg which 
holds Johannesburg International Airport, one of the major regional and international 
airports, (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2005; South Africa, 2014). According to 
SAICE out of the 34 million passenger movements which take place in all airports in 
South Africa, 18 million passenger movements take place at Johannesburg 
International Airport (SAICE, 2011:  22). Therefore Pretoria and Johannesburg are 
quite busy cities. Figure 5.1 below shows the map of Gauteng. 
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Figure: 5.1 Map of Gauteng 
 
 
As shown in the map above, the Gauteng province also encompasses three of South 
Africa‟s six metropolitan municipalities. The three metropolitan municipalities are 
Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. According to section 2 of the Municipal 
Structures Act, metropolitan municipalities are category A municipalities and may be 
distinguished from other categories of municipalities by their vibrant but complex 
diverse economy; their social and economic linkages which are strong and 
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interdependent and their need for interconnected development planning (Act 117 of 
1998). 
Besides its three metropolitan municipalities, Gauteng has the highest population 
and the highest number of workers in South Africa. According to the National 
Household Travel survey of 2013, 25.2% of the population in South Africa lives in 
Gauteng (Statistics South Africa, 2013:  10) while the Remuneration of Employees 
Turnover statistics for 2004 indicates that 49.6% remuneration for all employees in 
the country originated from Gauteng (Statistics South Africa, 2004:  1). 
In addition, the Gauteng province makes the highest contribution to the national 
economy. The Regional Growth Statistics for 2011 states 34.5% as the percentage 
Gauteng province contributes the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Statistics 
South Africa, 2011:  2). Furthermore, most of industries are based in Gauteng. For 
example, 43.3% of the construction industry; 40.5% of the manufacturing industry 
and 39.7% of general government services are found in Gauteng (Statistics South 
Africa, 2011:  4).  
5.3 Background to the Gautrain PPP 
The Gauteng province is unquestionably a highly populated province with a strong 
and vibrant economic base.  One of the consequences is that the province also 
faces traffic congestion, especially on the N1 Schoeman freeway which is located 
between Pretoria and Johannesburg.  In the early 2000s (and prior to the Gautrain 
PPP), the N1 freeway had up to 157,000 vehicles driving on the freeway every day, 
and was overwhelmed by traffic congestion. With the annual traffic growth rate of 7% 
for Gauteng province, it was argued that the traffic congestion was bound to get 
worse (Gautrain Management Agency, 2014: np).  Alternative transport 
arrangements became a topic of discussion – one such proposal was the revival of 
the passenger rail network system through the introduction of a rapid transit railway 
between Johannesburg and Pretoria to alleviate the traffic congestion on the N1 
freeway.   
It was posited that the introduction of the Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link would result to 
one fifth of the private car users on the N1 freeway being attracted to abandon 
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private car use and opt for use of the rail link as a means of transport and thereby 
achieve reduced traffic congestion on the freeway (Gautrain Management Agency, 
2014:  np).  It was also envisaged that the link would be carrying over 100,000 
passengers per day (National Assembly, 2005:  2990 [4]).  The proposal for a rapid-
rail-link system was put out for tender in 2000.  The successful bidder was the 
Bombela Consortium.  The Bombela Consortium is made up of five shareholders, 
namely Murray and Roberts (33%), Strategic Partners Group (SPG) (25%); 
Bombardier (17%), Bouygues Travaux Publics, (17%) and J and J Group (8%). 
Figure 5.2: Parties to the Gautrain PPP 
 
Source: Dachs, 2011, slide 14 
However, as explained in the previous chapter, the PPP Unit (located in the national 
Treasury department) first undertakes a rigorous assessment process.  The 
proposed PPP agreement has to meet the extensive legal requirements and 
processes set out in South Africa‟s policy framework.  The National Treasury 





5.4 The Governance of the Gautrain PPP 
In 2006, a contractual agreement between Gauteng provincial government and the 
Bombela Consortium was entered into, creating the official Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link 
(Gautrain) PPP.  The Gautrain PPP is a 20 year concession contract between the 
Gauteng provincial government (which is the public sector partner in this PPP) and 
the Bombela Consortium (which is the private sector partner in this PPP).  The PPP 
is based on a design-build-finance-operate-transfer (DBFOT) agreement (National 
Treasury, PPP Unit, 2013:  3).   
The then premier of Gauteng introduced the PPP as one of the province‟s ten spatial 
development initiatives (SDI). (Gauteng Provincial Government, Department of 
Transport and Public Works, 2000:  1).  
As advised by Treasury regulations, the Gautrain PPP is comprised of key governing 
structures set up for the purpose of managing different aspects of the Gautrain PPP.  
These are:  The Gautrain Management Act (Act 5 of 2006), The Gautrain 
Management Agency, and The Bombela Concession Company.  
The Gautrain Management Act (Act 5 of 2006) provides for the establishment of the 
Gautrain Management Agency with the mandate to manage and oversee the 
Gautrain PPP project. To accomplish the functions, section 4 of the Act obliges the 
Gautrain Management Agency to: 
i. Assist the Gauteng Province in the implementation and achievement of 
project objectives. 
ii. On behalf of the province, manage the relationship between Gauteng 
Province and Bombela Consortium and protect interests of the province. 
iii. Manage the assets and the finances of the Gautrain PPP project. 
iv. Promote liaison and cooperation between government structures in all the 




v. Promote socio-economic development and BBBEE objectives of the Gautrain 
PPP. 
vi. Monitor the policy and legislation environment of the Gautrain PPP, and 
vii. Enhance integration of the Gautrain PPP project with other transport service 
and public transport plans. 
Sections 32, 35 and 37, respectively require the Gautrain Management Agency to: 
open a bank account; comply with the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) 
regulations; and make a distinction between operational funding and project funding; 
as well as prepare annual reports (Gautrain Management Act 5 of 2006). 
The Act also empowers members of the Gauteng provincial Executive Council 
(MECs) to appoint the Board of the Gautrain Management Agency. This ensures that 
the public partner (the Gauteng province) in this PPP has oversight of the activities 
of the Gautrain Management Agency.  Section 14 mandates the Board to monitor 
activities of the Gautrain Management Agency and ensure compliance with the 
provisions of PFMA. The section also gives powers to the Board to oversee future 
contracts with financial implications between the Gautrain Management Agency and 
other institutions (Gautrain Management Act 5 of 2006).   
The Bombela Concession Company is the special purpose vehicle (SPV) set-up with 
the sole purpose to govern the construction and operation side of the project.  Figure 










Figure 5.3: The Bombela Concession Company (SPV) 
  
Source: Bombela Concession Company, 2014:  np 
Figure 5.3 above indicates that the SPV, the Bombela Concession Company, is 
responsible for managing the operational aspect of the projects such as appointing 
contractors for the building of the actual infrastructure and the actual operation of the 
project, including associated services.  For example, besides the operation of the 
Gautrain, it also manages the bus service contracts. 
The Gautrain PPP is a DBFOT (build-design-finance-operate-transfer) concession 
agreement. The Bombela Concession Company must connect the city of 
Johannesburg with the city of Pretoria - with a detour to connect Johannesburg with 
the Johannesburg International Airport (Gautrain Management Agency, 2013:  34). 
To enable the operation of the rapid-rail-link, the Bombela Concession Company is 
tasked with the responsibility for the provision and operationalisation of depot 
equipment; trains; signaling systems and feeder/distribution buses (Gautrain 
Management Agency, 2013). The 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment for the 
Proposed Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link between Johannesburg, Pretoria and 
Johannesburg International Airport Report explains that “feeder bus services 
transport passengers from points of destination to the train stations while distributor 
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bus services transport passengers from train stations to their final destinations”, 
(Gauteng Department of Public Transport and Public Works 2002:  6). 
The Gauteng provincial government is tasked under the PPP agreement to provide 
land for the construction of the track (Gautrain Management Agency, 2010:  46). In 
addition, the provincial government bears the patronage guarantee obligation which 
stipulate that regardless of low demand for Gautrain services, the Gauteng provincial 
government would pay Bombela Consortium patronage fees to cover the capital, 
maintenance and operational costs of the Consortium, (Gautrain Management 
Agency 2013:  38). 
The lifespan of the Gautrain is divided into two phases: the first phase lasting 54 
months and the second, 15 years. The first 54 months were for the designing and 
construction of the rapid-rail-link system while the remaining 15 years constitute the 
operational period (Gautrain Management Agency, 2013:  38). The construction 
phase would commence in 2006 and end in mid-2010 while the operational phase 
would start in the mid-2010 and end at 2026 after which period the rail-rail-link 
system will be transferred wholly to the Gauteng provincial government, bringing an 
end to the PPP agreement (Gautrain Management Agency, 2014:  np). 
5.5 Gautrain Financing 
As explained above, the provincial government is the public sector partner in the 
Gautrain PPP.  It is also the financier of the project.  According to Dachs (2011) the 
total development cost for the Gautrain is R26 billion (Dachs, 2011:  slide 10) and 
the costs are spread across five sources of funding (Dachs, 2011:  slide 15). The 
sources of funding are the national budget allocation (through the annual Division of 
Revenue Act [DoRA]) which is channeled through the DoT;  the Gauteng provincial 
government budget; private sector equity;  private sector borrowing and provincial 
borrowing (Dachs, 2011:  slide 15). The chart 5.1 below displays the percentages 





Chart 5.1: Gautrain PPP Financing 
 
                    Source: Dachs, 2011:  slide 16 
As demonstrated in Chart 5.1 the government contributes 88.7% of the costs of the 
project while the private party, the Bombela Consortium, only contributes 11.3% to 
the cost of the Gautrain PPP.  It must be borne in mind that this type of PPP is one 
where government is the financier, and the private sector provides the actual 
infrastructure.  The private partners borrow finance from the government (88.7%) 
and fund the remaining 11.3% with their own revenue (which could be through their 
own private borrowing, or equity).  Government receives a return on their borrowings 
through the interest charged to the Bombela Consortium, while the Consortium is 
awarded the rights to the proceeds of the Gautrain for the duration of the PPP.   The 
risk is shared in that the Bombela Consortium is contractually obligated to provide 
the infrastructure at the standards agreed to as well as repay the government loan 
on the terms set.  On the other hand, the government takes a risk in assuming that 
Bombela can fulfil its contractual obligations. 
5.6 Project Cycle for Gautrain  
The phases, timelines and some of the major activities as they happened in the 
Gautrain are highlighted in Table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1: Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link Project Cycle 
Cycle Phase Timeline Activities 
1 Inception February, 2000 to 
June, 2000 
- Announcement of the Project 
- Appointment of Project Technical Team 
- Development of Inception Report 
2 Feasibility 
study  
July, 2000 to 
April, 2005 
- 2000 – 2001 Feasibility studies 
- Submission of Feasibility Study report and Request For Qualification 
(RFQs) to Treasury 
- Receipt of 1st PPP Treasury approval (2002) 
- Issuance, receipt and evaluation of RFQs (2002) 
- Submission of Bid Evaluation report and Request For Proposals (RFPs) 
documents to National Treasury 
- Receipt of 2nd PPP Treasury approval (2002) 
- Announcement of Bombela and Gauliwe consortia as successful 
bidders (2002) 




- Submission of evaluation report on the proposals to PPP Unit 
- Receipt of 3rd PPP Treasury approval (2005) 
- Negotiations with Bombela Consortium  
- Submission of PPP Agreement Management Plan to Treasury 
- Announcement of Bombela Consortium as the preferred bidder (2005) 
4 Development August, 2005 to 
June, 2012 
- Mobilization of resources including finances 
 R7.1 billion set aside in the national budget (2006) 
 R3.1 billion loan commitment by Rand Merchant Bank and 
Standard of South Africa to Bombela Consortium (2007) 
- Relocation of utilities such as water pipes and electricity grids 
- Finalization of agreements with Bombela Consortium 
- Preliminary design for all sections of the rapid rail link 
- Commencement of construction 
- Dispute settlements 
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- Monitoring and receipt of progress reports 
6 Delivery June, 2012 to 
September, 2026 
- Construction phase delivered (June, 2012) 
- Operation phase delivery due 2026 
- Dispute settlements 
- Monitoring and receipt of progress reports 
7 Exist 2026 - (Awaiting due date) 
Source: GMA, 2014:  np
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5.7 Outcomes of the Gautrain  
The processes of the Gautrain project cycle outlined in Table 5.1 have not been without 
challenges. While technically, the process has met the legal requirements as stipulated 
by the Treasury, a number of issues have arisen in the course of the project cycle which 
threatened the Gautrain project.  According to the Business Day Newspaper the rail 
system has experienced rampant theft of copper cables. The Chief Executive Officer of 
the Gautrain Management Agency claimed that cable thefts have not only caused 
disruptions in the schedules for trains but also loss of money from potential train 
passengers. The newspaper reported that during the 2010/11 financial year twelve 
cases of cable thefts were reported (Business Day, 26 September, 2011:  3). 
Strikes by employees of the Bombela Concession Company have also caused 
problems for the Gautrain PPP. The Business Day Newspaper claimed that over a 
period of six months (between August, 2011 and February, 2012) the Company had 
experienced five employee strikes. Four of the strikes were by bus drivers while one 
was by security guards. The Bombela Concession Company alleged that the strikes 
resulted in a loss of train passengers by between 10% and 15% (Business Day, 3 
February, 2012:  2). 
Disputes between the Bombela Concession Company and the Gauteng provincial 
government pose another challenge to the Gautrain‟s planned project cycle. The 2013 
Gautrain Management Agency Annual Report notes that despite Bombela Concession 
Company indicating that it had fulfilled its construction obligations for the construction 
phase of the project and the Independent Certifier confirming the same in June 2012, 
the Gauteng provincial government has refused to take delivery. According to the 
Report, the Gauteng provincial government argued that water leakages along some 
parts of the underground tunnel of the rapid-rail-link were enough evidence that the 
construction was not satisfactorily done (Gautrain Management Agency, 2013:  45). The 
matter has since been resolved by the Arbitration Foundation of South Africa which 
ordered Bombela Consortium on 23rd November, 2013 to conduct some corrective 
works along some parts of the link (Gautrain Management Agency, 2013:  np).  
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Thus despite the Gautrain PPP cycle flow within the precepts stipulated in the PPP 
Manual for national and provincial governments in South Africa, social and 
environmental issues appear to have presented challenges in the Gautrain PPP.  
The above discussion shows that while a PPP agreement process may meet the 
legislative requirements, it still faces socio-economic implementation challenges which 
those responsible for governing the PPP project need to take into consideration 
throughout the duration of the project. 
The outcomes of the Gautrain are mixed and as such have given rise to both positive 
and negative results and reactions. The positive outcomes include: 
The conclusion of an 80-kilometer rapid rail link with ten train stations which connects 
Johannesburg and Pretoria; and Johannesburg and Johannesburg International Airport 
(Dachs, 2011: slides 9 and 10).  Merwe claims that the rail link has direct coordination 
with Metrorail Services at Johannesburg Park Station, Pretoria main station, Hatfield 
and Kempton Park, (Merwe, 2001: 5). Furthermore, the Gautrain Management Agency 
Annual Report for 2013 indicates that the Gautrain has physical interfaces with 
municipal taxis and buses at Park Station (Gautrain Management Agency, 2013:  118). 
As of March, 2013 the Gautrain was transmitting about 42, 000 train passenger per day 
(Gautrain Management Agency, 2013:  46). 
The Gautrain has led to the promotion of BBBEE. The inclusion of SPG as a partner in 
the Bombela Consortium and the procurement of employees and services from black 
South Africans has increased economic prospects of people previously disadvantaged 
by apartheid. Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 below illustrate the extent to which BBBEE has 
been infused in the Gautrain. 
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Figure 5.4: BBBEE Equity in the Gautrain 
 
Source: Gautrain Management Agency, 2010:  40 
Figures 5.4 shows that SPG equity in Bombela Consortium is in fact above the target 
set out in the BBBEE scorecard discussed in chapter 3. For example, the recommended 
weighting for black equity in a private party is 20% (National Treasury, 2004:  26), 
however in the case of Gautrain the equity has exceeded the recommended weighting 










Figure 5.5 BBBEE Procurement in the Gautrain 
 
Source: GMA, 2013:  54 
In respect of procurement from black South Africans, Figure 5.5 shows that in most 
respects the targets laid down in the concession agreement have been exceeded. For 
example, procurement and subcontracting from new BEEs; women in management 
positions and black South Africans in occupational Level C exceed the stipulated targets 
by over 300%.  
The concession agreement between the Gauteng provincial government and Bombela 
Consortium obliges Bombela Consortium to meet twenty-one socio economic 
development activities whose objective is to promote BBBEE (Gautrain Management 
Agency, 2013:  52). BBBEE in the Gautrain PPP is accomplished at two levels as per 
the concession agreement. Firstly, through the inclusion of a black South African owned 
company (SPG) in the Consortium and, secondly through the procurement of 
employees and services from previously disadvantaged people (Gautrain Management 
Agency, 2013:  53).  The SPG is the fulfillment of equity of black-owned company in the 
Bombela Consortium (Local Government Supplier, 2005:  50). According to the SPG 
website, SPG was formed in 2002 and became a shareholder in the Bombela 
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Consortium who bid for Gautrain project. The website indicates that the SPG comprises 
of businesses and individuals with a history of being previously discriminated against by 
apartheid policies. The website further indicates that the individuals include 
professionals, black businesses, youth and women with skills in construction; financial 
services and transportation (SPG, 2014:  np). 
The incorporation of SPG into the Bombela Consortium and the procurement of black 
South African employees and services enabled Bombela Consortium to comply with the 
legislative and policy directives aimed at the BBBEE requirements of PPPs.  However, 
the presence of SPG and the subsequent approval of the Bombela Consortium as the 
preferred bidder in the Gautrain PPP raised controversy in 2006.  The Sunday Times 
newspaper reported that four national government officials had connections with SPG 
and implied that this influenced the National Treasury‟s approval of the Bombela 
Consortium (Sunday Times, 26th November, 2006:  1). Although the then ANC president 
confirmed the connections of the four government officials to SPG, it was argued that 
the officials were distanced from influencing the decision on grounds that the selection 
of Bombela Consortium was made by the Gauteng provincial government and not the 
national government (ANC Today, 8th December, 2006:  np). 
Mushongahande, Cloete and Venter (2014) claim that the Gautrain PPP has spurred 
property development along the route of the rail link. The Impact of the Gautrain on 
Property Development around Station Precincts‟ research conducted by the trio in 2014 
concluded that property development on areas around the Gautrain-Rapid-Rail-Link 
stations had increased since 2000. For example, the research noted that twenty-one 
properties that include offices, residential and retail have been developed at Rosebank 
station since 2000 while at Midrand station Old Mutual has set up residential and retail 
property (Mushongahande, Cloete and Venter, 2014:  7).   
The socio-economic development which Gautrain has led to contradicts the initial fears 
of properties owners and residents in the suburbs of Muckleneuk and Lucksrand in 
Gauteng about their perceived decline in property value. Properties owners and 
residents in the suburbs of Muckleneuk and Lucksrand in Gauteng complained to the 
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Court in 2004 that the route would destroy specialist fields and the heritage of their area 
(High Court of South Africa, 2006). The concerns by the property owners and the 
residents of Muckleneuk and Lukasrand were supported by the business people of 
Rosebank who complained that the construction of Rosebank train station had 
environmentally polluted the area through noise, filth and dust. As such customers were 
shunning the area resulting in businesses losses of between 40% and 60% (Mail and 
Guardian, 27 September, 2007). The properties owners and residents of Muckleneuk 
and Lucksrand, however, lost the case against the Gauteng provincial government in 
2006 (Pretoria News, 31 August, 2006).The case, however, points to the government‟s 
lack of community involvement in the initial stages of the project. 
Notwithstanding the positive outcomes which have ensued from the Gautrain, the PPP 
has also drawn some negative reactions. Some of the negative reactions include: 
The National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Transport (PCT) claimed that the 
conceptualisation of the Gautrain PPP lacked transparency and that important 
stakeholders such as Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality were not actively engaged in the feasibility and planning 
studies of the project (National Assembly, 2005:  2990).  In fact the PCT recommended 
reassessment of the whole Gautrain project to ensure public participation before the 
Gautrain project could commence (National Assembly, 2005:  2990-2995). 
COSATU has opposed the Gautrain on the basis that the rail link is not responsive to 
the needs of the people most in need of public transport. COSATU has maintained that 
the route of Gautrain does not pass through where most poor people and workers who 
need public transport live (iol News, 2006: np). In a 2014 Press Statement, COSATU 
reiterated that Gautrain project benefit a few rich people who already have other means 
of transport at the expense of poor people (COSATU, 2014:  np). 
Donaldson (2005) argues that the Gautrain rapid rail link route was misconceived. 
Donaldson (2005) claims that the rapid rail route did not go through the eastern suburbs 
of Pretoria where most of trips between Johannesburg and Pretoria originate from and 
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where most business are located and therefore more employment location. Donaldson 
contends that political influence and poor research methods diverted the project from 
the area that could have benefited the population the most (Donaldson, 2005:  57). 
Besides the governance issues, the Gautrain has instigated environmental and safety 
concerns from various quarters. As discussed above the Gauteng provincial 
government refused to take delivery of the construction phase due to water seepages it 
regarded as a safety and environmental concerns. Again property owners and the 
residents of Muckleneuk and Lukasrand as well as business people of Rosebank 
expressed concern over the destruction of heritage and pollution of the environment as 
a result of Gautrain construction works. 
Whilst the Gautrain is rated highly by some sectors of the society in South Africa, some 
stakeholders are of the view that Gautrain has been ill-conceived. In short, 
notwithstanding the positive outcomes which the Gautrain has resulted into, governance 
issues such as inadequate stakeholder participation; the indifference of the Gautrain to 
environmental concerns and public transport needs for the majority of South Africans 
mar the reputation of Gautrain. 
5.8 Conclusion 
While the Gautrain may not subscribe to all factors that motivate use of PPPs such as 
cost savings in service provision; improved quality of services and infrastructure and 
efficiency, the need to improve access to public infrastructure and the need to access 
private sector‟s competencies and capacities appear pertinent to the Gautrain. The 
reduction of traffic on N1 freeway between Johannesburg and Pretoria will not only 








This study has explored the history of PPPs and demonstrated the different 
conceptualisations of PPPs. It has been shown that the use of PPPs is motivated by 
various factors such as economic, social and political factors. The various processes 
which PPPs go through ascertain that PPPs are unique and diverse.  They may range 
from the provision of a small management contract to a government department to large 
and extensive infrastructure projects. Teisman and Klijn affirm that PPPs “create new 
and complex arrangements and processes” (Teisman and Klijn, 2002:  200). As such 
PPPs call for particular forms of governance including legislation, institutions, systems 
and processes to facilitate their implementation (Teisman and Klijn, 2002). 
PPPs may be used using a range of contractual agreements depending on the services 
expected from the private sector and the role to be played by government in the PPP. 
However, in general, the longer the contract period the more risks the PPP inherently 
holds. It would appear governments are keen to include the private sector in large 
infrastructure projects to reduce their (government‟s) risk exposure.  (EU, 2003:  26). 
South Africa has not been left out in the use of PPPs, including small service 
management contract agreements and large infrastructure projects. The government 
has put in place legislation and policies which enable the use of PPPs in all three 
spheres of government. The legislation and policies spell out the steps to be followed in 
the procurement of PPPs. Legislation and policy for PPPs in South Africa stresses 
affordability; value for money; substantial risk transfer and empowerment of black South 
Africans as pillars for each PPP (National Treasury, PPP Unit, 2007). On top of that, 
there is a dedicated PPP Unit which provides technical support in the use and 
implementation of PPPs.  
It has been argued that the role of public transport in the advancement of a country‟s 
economy is significant. “Public transport has a significant role to play in enhancing 
urban mobility, reducing congestion, decreasing the impact on the environment of 
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harmful emissions and better serving economy.” (Walters, 2008:  98). This paper has 
shown that the transport sector in South Africa faces numerous challenges. Challenges 
range from poor services to inadequate and outdated infrastructure. The DoT in South 
Africa asserts that the demand for road and transport services and infrastructure 
exceeds available public funding (DoT, 2013:  145). Consequently PPPs have become 
imperative.  
The objective of this study was to analyse the governance of the Gautrain Rapid-Rail-
Link PPP and ascertain some of the issues facing PPPs in South Africa, with particular 
reference to the Gautrain PPP. The case study has shown that PPPs in South Africa 
are capable of bringing benefits in the form of enhanced technical expertise and 
efficiency; high internationally comparative service infrastructure as well as socio-
economic gains, among other things.  
The Gautrain itself has not met its carrying capacity.  Currently, only 42,000 train 
passengers per day as opposed to the projected 100,000 passengers utilize the 
Gautrain.  However, the DoT is still supportive of the PPP because it feels that it has 
facilitated the integration of bus, taxi and airport transport services through the interface 
it has with municipal taxis and busses; feeder and distribution bus services and trips to 
Johannesburg airport. It may be argued that the integration improves the efficiency and 
access in public transport (DoT, 2013).  
Furthermore, the Gautrain has reaffirmed that PPPs entail risk sharing between the 
public sector and the private sector. Whilst government has had to bear with court 
cases to access land, as it happened the matter involving properties owners and 
residents in the suburbs of Muckleneuk and Lucksrand, Bombela will have to find 
mechanisms to deal with strikes and cable thefts which may decrease its profits.   
One could argue that the Gautrain PPP‟s general governance approach could have 
improved on issues such as transparency and accountability. Greve and Hodge (2010) 
argument made in Chapter 2 pertaining to the use of consultants in PPPs - that the 
engagement of consultants keeps away the involvement of the public and other 
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stakeholders is tested in the Gautrain. While the Gautrain has demonstrated that PPPs 
may be a good vehicle for the attainment of BBBEE, the controversy which SPG 
courted, as discussed above, may easily overshadow benefits of PPPs. The case 
stresses the importance of transparency and accountability in the PPP procurement 
process and it also serves as a caution of the susceptibility of PPPs to political 
interference or patronage.  
Thus while there is still debate on whether PPPs are new forms of governance or not, or 
indeed if some of the so called PPPs are PPPs, one thing is certain. PPPs have 
become entrenched as part of governance in the public sector. “The concept (of PPP) 
promises a new way of managing and governing organizations that produce public 
services”, (Hodge and Greve, 2007:  545). PPPs such as the Gautrain have the 
potential to reduce urban traffic congestion and integrating public transport. 
Nevertheless, there is need for further research on how the public and the other 
stakeholders may be effectively involved in projects such as the Gautrain. While the 
Gautrain seem to have engaged the public and stakeholders it would appear the 
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